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Abstract
In the first chapter, I exploit the rebranding of a mortgage lender, under a more
salient name and in some Italian provinces, to empirically analyze households’
choice behaviour in response to brand popularity. Loan-level data on both
the universe of newly originated mortgages and the offer rates suggest that
(1) brand awareness reduces the equilibrium price of residential mortgage con-
tracts and (2) the reduction mainly reflects consumers’ selection into cheaper
products. Comparing contracted rates with concurrent market offers from the
main online mortgage broker in Italy, I show that households’ reallocation to-
wards less expensive choices is unlikely to reflect pure substitution behaviours
induced by brand persuasion. In fact, my findings support the informative
view that brand awareness improves consumers’ search and allows them to
obtain more convenient deals, with an overall decrease in price dispersion.
In the second chapter, we back empirical findings with theoretical foun-
dations, and quantify the impact of brand name on consumers’ search costs
and borrowers’ transition across lenders within a life-cycle model. The model is
well calibrated to replicate main features of the Italian household sector and to
match the level of dispersion in the price of mortgage products encountered in
the data. Model calibrations imply a 330 euro reduction in consumers’ search
costs due to brand popularity, and roughly a 10 percentage points increase in
the share of households that move to cheaper lenders. The treatment effect
of brand name on price dispersion is in line with the empirical evidence in
chapter one.
In the third chapter, we use information on mortgage supply available
from the online broker to assess trends in lending strategies of Italian banks.
We document that (1) riskier mortgages (high loan-to-value, low borrower’s
income, and long maturity) are offered by fewer banks that charge higher
rates; (2) keeping the level of risk constant, online banks offer better price
conditions than traditional ones. We then use online offer rates to nowcast
bank-level official rates (MIR). By relying on both regression analysis and
machine learning algorithms (random forest), we show that online prices have
a high predictive content for the equilibrium price of fixed-rate mortgages, and
allow for a very timely assessment of changes in household financing conditions.
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1. Information or persuasion in the
mortgage market: the role of brand name
1.1 Introduction
How do consumers respond to brand name? The answer to this question is
far from obvious. When shopping for a product, customers typically do not
observe all options and have to find the one to their liking through search. They
may first visit the seller whose name is more salient, and stop there if the deal
they find is attractive enough to make searching not worthwhile to continue
(Haan & Moraga-González 2011). Brand popularity might influence shopping
behaviour in two ways. Either by increasing market knowledge, acting like a
signaling device that reveals better alternatives to uninformed clients (Nelson
1970; Robert & Stahl 1993), or by creating spurious loyalty that persuades
consumers into worse options (Braithwaite 1928; Robinson 1933).1
I address the dichotomy between brand persuasion and brand information
in the Italian mortgage market and ask whether popularity of the brand causes
borrowers to select high-price lenders (persuasive effect), or to switch to less
expensive ones (informative effect). My main contribution is to provide em-
pirical evidence in support of the informative role of brand name. I exploit the
rebranding of a mortgage lender under a more salient name in some Italian
provinces, and show that superior awareness of the brand induces households’
reallocation to low-price lenders, with an overall decrease in price dispersion.
Results set apart from previous empirical findings by Gurun et al. (2016),
which document consumers’ persuasion in the US subprime mortgage market,
and instead are consistent with earlier works by Agarwal et al. (2017); Alexan-
drov & Koulayev (2017); Bhutta et al. (2018) and McManus & Yi (2018) for
the US, and by Allen et al. (2014a) and Allen et al. (2019) for Canada, pre-
1The debate has centered on consumer goods, for which artificial product differentiation can
be attained along many dimensions (Telser 1964; Nelson 1974; Comanor & Wilson 1975;
Cubbin & Domberger 1988), while minor attention has been given to homogeneous goods
characterized by few observable characteristics. With respect to the mortgage market, the
only piece of empirical evidence relates to the US, and specifically refers to the persua-
sive role of advertising in leading borrowers towards more expensive choices (Agarwal &
Ambrose 2008; Gurun et al. 2016).
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senting evidence of wide dispersion in the mortgage rates that households pay
on identical loans. This rate differential translates into substantial upfront
costs for the borrower, an important component of which is attributable to
knowledge and search.2
The Italian mortgage market has specific institutional features that differ-
entiate it from others. In Italy, unlike Canada and the US, individual-based
pricing and negotiation between the borrower and the lender are limited, thus
all borrowers purchasing the same mortgage product pay close to the adver-
tised rate (Gambacorta et al. 2019). Yet, this is not indicative of convergence
towards the lowest price. Quite the opposite, price dispersion is material and
overpayment concerns all borrower types (Carella et al. 2020).3 Search costs,
time constraints, brand loyalty, negotiation ability, they all offer a reasonable
explanation for this (as in Allen et al. 2014a and in Allen et al. 2019), and
they do even more so in a market, like the Italian one, dominated by tra-
ditional brick-and-mortar banks, where contracts are mainly settled at the
physical branch.4 It should also be noted that mortgages are complex prod-
ucts and some of their features might result obscure to households, or might
require some degree of financial literacy which they lack (Hall & Woodward
2012; Gathergood & Weber 2017). This creates a demand for information and
makes borrowers genuinely inclined to trust the intermediary with superior
brand name. It also raises the question whether or not branding increases
market knowledge and helps households choose the cheapest from a set of
mortgage options.
Isolating the effect of brand name on consumers’ behaviour is no easy task
given the existence of several confounding factors (the macroeconomic scenario
and the outlook of the financial sector, banks’ policies and strategies, as well
as borrowers’ and lenders’ characteristics). On top of that, individuals’ choices
over time are rarely observable, due to both confidentiality of this information
and the absence of granular data. To tackle the first issue, I exploit variation
2Additional works include Iscenko (2018) for the UK, which illustrates that many borrowers
choose mortgage products overpriced relative to other available alternatives; and Damen
& Buyst (2017) for Belgium, according to which shopping allows mortgagors to save more.
3Price dispersion in Italy is mainly driven by contract characteristics (in particular, the loan-
to-value, the rate type and the maturity) and figures are comparable to those recorded in
other countries, including the US (Bhutta et al. 2018) and Canada (Allen et al. 2014a).
4In Italy, mortgages originated via MutuiOnline (the major online broker) amounted to
about 6 per cent of the total in 2015, though this share is on the rise (Carella et al. 2020).
In the same period, fintech lenders accounted for about 16 per cent of the US mortgage
market (Buchak et al. 2018).
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in brand name induced by the rebranding of a mortgage lender in some Italian
provinces. My set-up closely resembles that of a natural experiment where
nothing changes with the rebranding event, except for the name of the bank
in those affected provinces. Parties involved are the subsidiary and the parent
bank of a leading banking group in Italy. Importantly, they both follow the
same pricing and offering policies, defined at the group headquarter level, and
they each target specific Italian provinces, with no overlapping. The two banks
belong to the group since January 2007, but have been operating with distinct
brand names and identities until before August 2018 (rebranding event). At
this time, the parent bank incorporates the subsidiary and replaces the brand
with its own, more popular, one in all the provinces where the subsidiary is
located (treated provinces). The event has no effect on the pricing and offering
policies of the two banks (in fact, these are already in common), but it increases
consumers’ awareness of the brand in provinces (treated) where the name of
the subsidiary changes into the one of the parent, and becomes more famous.5
This rebranding constitutes my key source of exogenous variation in brand
name across provinces, allowing me to identify the causal effect of brand pop-
ularity on households’ choice of mortgage products. To overcome the second
challenge, arising from limited information on individuals’ mortgage choice, I
count on the richness of my dataset, covering all new mortgage originations in
Italy before and after the rebranding event. I take data from the Central Credit
Register (CR) on mortgages originated in Italy over the period from 2018Q1
to 2018Q4.6 To identify the treatment effect of brand name on the equilibrium
price of mortgage contracts, I rely on a Difference-in-Differences design and
compare the evolution of mortgage rates around the rebranding event (August
2018) in treated provinces versus remaining provinces not affected by the shock
(control group). To make sure that findings are not artificially driven by un-
derlying price trends, within the same group of treated provinces, I also look
at what happens to the lender’s main competitor, which is not experiencing
any rebranding. My main result is that brand name reduces (by roughly 4
basis points)7 the average equilibrium price of new mortgages issued by the
5I use Google Trends by region to measure brand awareness.
6Throughout the analysis I focus on indebted borrowers for which I observe a past lending
relationship, and I either control for first-time borrowers or exclude them as they belong
to a different sample.
7This reduction is quite relevant given an average annual percentage rate of about 2 per
cent in Italy.
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rebranding lender in treated provinces, while it has no effect on the competitor
lender.8 Noteworthy, as the offer rate does not change, the encountered price
reduction mainly reflects consumers’ selection into less expensive products.9
Although interesting, the above result is compatible with two different house-
holds’ behaviours: either a pure substitution pattern in favour of the lender
whose name is more salient, and regardless of its expensiveness, or a more ef-
ficient search, which translates into borrowers’ reallocation towards low-price
intermediaries. To discriminate between the two, and corroborate my claim
that branding improves consumers’ ability to select the cheapest option (infor-
mative branding), I compare actual transactions with concurrent market offers.
I match contracted rates with rates posted over the same period through Italy’s
main online broker, MutuiOnline, and come up with a very detailed, quarterly,
loan-level dataset accounting for all the most important features of both the
contract and the borrower (mortgage rate, amount, loan-to-value, maturity,
rate type, borrower’s income, job type, age and location). My merged dataset
has fewer observations, but allows for significant improvements with respect to
preceding works as I can exclude changes in the lenders’ pricing and offering
policies at the time of the event, and I can control for variables, previously not
observable, that account for most of the variation in transacted rates (i.e. the
mortgage maturity and the loan-to-value).10 With such refinements at hand,
I am able to track down households’ response to brand name in all provinces,
across all banks, and for any given mortgage product. Holding contract char-
acteristics constant, I find that branding allows households at the top and
middle of the transaction price distribution to obtain cheaper products. Most
importantly, I show that households turn to the lender whose name is more
popular only when the latter is also less expensive. That is, brand name allows
to gather attention, but it does so only when combined with more competitive
prices. I interpret this as evidence against brand persuasion: branding induces
consumers to make more comparisons and, when there are lower prices, to
choose the cheapest option.11 I also find that brand popularity is mostly effec-
8This occurs because households switching to the rebranding lender come indistinguishably
from all points of the transaction price distribution of its competitor, so that no aggregate
effect emerges for the latter in equilibrium.
9Offer rates are observed from MutuiOnline and are not specific to online clients. Actually,
they match those offered at the physical branch and listed on the bank’s website.
10See also Carella et al. (2020); and for the UK Benetton (2018) and Robles-Garcia (2019).
11This is in line with the models of optimal consumer search behavior developed by Ozga
(1960) and Stigler (1961), where brand awareness reduces consumers’ search costs by
CHAPTER 1. BRAND INFORMATION VERSUS PERSUASION 14
tive at switchers, that choose the rebranding bank for the first time, compared
to old clients, that have an already established lending relationship with that
bank. This further validates the thesis that an informative channel is at play.
Intuitively, old clients already know the parent and for them the informative
effect of branding is limited. Switchers, instead, are less informed and can
fully enjoy the benefits of branding. The result is relevant because recourse to
mortgage renegotiations (a proxy of households’ switching behaviour) has be-
come quite popular in Italy, reaching 17 per cent of the new loans origination
in 2018 (Attinà & Michelangeli 2020).12
Understanding the relationships between brand name and the price of mort-
gages is important both because of the central role played by mortgage debt
in households’ credit landscape,13 and because of trends that are currently
shaping the Italian banking sector and that may, in turn, alter the intensity
of local branding. In particular, my paper carries interesting policy implica-
tions with respect to ongoing bank consolidation strategies. It suggests that
consolidation of small banks under a single name could have a positive impact
on the lender’s ability to reach potential clients similar to the one induced by
an increase in consumers’ incentive to seek information through the awareness
mechanism. However, the informative effect only arises if consolidation also
implies the simultaneous rebranding of the lender under a more popular name.
Related Literature. Although the literature acknowledges the important
role of brand name on consumers’ choice, the nature of this role is still not clear
(Bagwell et al. 2007; Della Vigna 2009; Della Vigna & Gentzkow 2010). As
economists struggle to reach consensus, there are three main views. According
to the predominant one, branding is persuasive, for it creates spurious product
differentiation and instills brand loyalty, which both distort competition and
persuade consumers into bad choices (Braithwaite 1928; Kaldor 1950; Comanor
& Wilson 1975; Thaler & Sunstein 2008; Gurun et al. 2016). In contrast to
that, branding increases market knowledge and reduces search costs under the
informative view, thereby allowing consumers to find better products (Ozga
conveying information on product’s existence, price and quality.
12With the so called Bersani Law in 2008, households are allowed to modify their contract
terms and, specifically, they can reduce their mortgage instalments without paying any
additional extra costs. This lead to an acceleration in mortgage renegotiations, particularly
pronounced since 2015.
13Mortgages represent the main liability for Italian households, accounting for over 50% of
their financial debt.
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1960; Stigler 1961; Telser 1964; Nelson 1974; Robert & Stahl 1993). The third
possibility is that branding enters consumers’ preferences in a way that is
complementary to consumption and without changing consumers’ preferences,
but rather by influencing their behavior through both information and social
prestige (Lancaster 1966; Stigler & Becker 1977; Nichols 1985). This paper
adds to the debate on the role of brand name and provides empirical evidence
in favour of the informative view. I bring together the literature on price
dispersion for homogeneous goods (Allen et al. 2014a; Allen et al. 2014b; Allen
et al. 2019) with the one on mortgage choices under imperfect consumers’
information (Agarwal & Ambrose 2008; Gurun et al. 2016), and conclude that
brand awareness leads to lower variation in the price of comparable mortgages.
Finally, I complement existing approaches in household finance that study
the determinants of mortgage choice under the assumption that the resulting
contract reflects households’ preferences (Mian & Sufi 2011; Hall & Woodward
2012; Fuster & Vickery 2013; Campbell & Cocco 2015; Foá et al. 2015; Hurst
et al. 2016). In doing that, I am the first to exploit data on product offers from
an online broker (the only source of information on the mortgage loan-to-value
currently available in Italy) as to account for variability in the equilibrium
mortgage price associated with the loan-to-value. More broadly, this work
also relates to the emerging literature on how technology changes financial
intermediation and price setting (Cavallo 2017; Basten et al. 2018; Fuster
et al. 2018; Gorodnichenko et al. 2018; Hertzberg et al. 2018; Bartlett et al.
2019; Basten et al. 2019).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 outlines some styl-
ized facts about the Italian residential mortgage market, including anecdotal
evidence on the rebranding event, and describes my main data sources. Sec-
tion 3.3 provides supportive evidence to the argument that the rebranding
exclusively affects consumers’ awareness of the brand. Section 1.4 states the
identification and estimation strategy, and discusses the main empirical find-
ings. Section 3.4 concludes.
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1.2 Rebranding Event and Data
1.2.1 The Rebranding Event
I look at variation in brand name induced by the rebranding of a leading
banking group in Italy. The group owns several subsidiary banks active in
different provinces, with no overlapping. The pricing and offering policies of
each subsidiary are laid down by the parent and are common to all group
components.14 Actors taking part to the rebranding are the group parent
bank and one group subsidiary. The latter joined the group in January 2007,
as a result of a merger operation, but kept its own brand name (different
from the parent’s one). Few years later, in August 2018, the parent bank
absorbs the subsidiary and replaces its brand. The brand of the subsidiary
is decommissioned. This within-group incorporation only concerns provinces
targeted by the subsidiary, whose name de facto becomes the one of the parent
and inherits its much greater popularity. Nothing else changes as a result of
the incorporation in terms of both policy implemented by parties involved,
and resulting menu of product choices available to the consumer. Throughout
the paper, I refer to this event as the rebranding event. I define as treated
the provinces exposed to the subsidiary brand before the event and to the
parent brand after, and as control the remaining provinces not affected by the
within-group incorporation and thus exposed to the same brand before and
after the event. The variation in brand awareness induced by the rebranding
of the lender under a more famous name allows us to evaluate which of the
informative or persuasive view on branding can best explain patterns in my
data. I claim that brand awareness increases market knowledge and, in so
doing, favours less expensive choices.
1.2.2 Data
My main data sources are confidential regulatory datasets collected by the
Bank of Italy as part of its supervisory activities: the Central Credit Register
14I can exclude that bank-level policies change after the event. According to the group
guidelines for managing the Fund Transfer Price System (FTP), the principles and guide-
lines set forth by the parent must be consistent at consolidated level and implemented by
all group subsidiaries.
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(CR) and the Analytical Survey of Lending Rates (TAXIA).15 The CR contains
information on loans, granted and utilized, and guarantees for each borrower
whose aggregate exposure exceeds 30,000 euro. All financial intermediaries
operating in Italy have to report this information to the Bank of Italy on a
monthly basis in order to comply with Italian banking regulation. TAXIA is a
subset of the CR and contains quarterly data on the interest rates that banks
charge to individual households on each newly issued mortgage loan. I match
the two datasets at the borrower level and get comprehensive information
on the universe of residential mortgage originations in Italy from 2018Q1 to
2018Q4. Over this period, for each mortgage, I observe details on the lender’s
identity, the contract (annual percentage rate or APR, loan amount, rate type,
maturity),16 and the borrower (location, age, gender and nationality). Table
1.1 summarizes the data. I observe about 125 thousand mortgage contracts,
of which more than 90% are FRM and the remaining ones are ARM. Other
mortgage typologies, such as mixed-rate mortgages (characterized by a part of
the mortgage rate which is fixed and a part which is adjustable), or adjustable
rate mortgages with a cap, or those allowing to reset the interest rate (similarly
to the five year-ARM in the US), are either very rare or they do not exists at
all. The average APR is around 2%, with some regional variation; the average
loan amount is around 130,000 euro; the average loan maturity is 22 years. The
mean borrower is 38 years old; more than 50% of the mortgagors are located
in the North, 25.33% in Central Italy and the remaining 23.73% in the South.
I complement this data with information at the contract level on mortgage
offers available from the leading online broker in Italy, MutuiOnline (MO).17
MO data are available on a monthly basis since March 2018.18 Banks working
with MO are 30 and they include the 10 largest banks in the country, account-
ing for about 70% of total mortgage originations.19 House value is fixed at
15The CR is a confidential database managed by the Bank of Italy and TAXIA is a subset
of the CR. Information of how to access these data is available here.
16The CR contains information on the residual maturity of the loan. To recover the original
maturity, I use the French amortization method. A full description of the estimation
methodology is provided in Appendix A.
17MO data are confidential and have been provided to the Bank of Italy free of charge by
mutuionline.it for research purposes. Access to MO data for this thesis has been given by
Valentina Michelangeli at the Bank of Italy.
18This information is adequate for a broad assessment of the Italian mortgage market because
mortgages are almost entirely granted by banks and other financial intermediaries tend
not to participate at all.
19These are the intermediaries I am left with as I keep the sample constant throughout my
observation period.
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200,000 euro, and mortgage amount varies with the LTV. Each month I ob-
serve the APR, if any, that participating banks are willing to offer to roughly
85,000 perspective profiles, constant over time. Each profile is defined by a
combination of the following borrower and contract characteristics: borrower
type (first-time home buyer or remortgager), location (borrower location is
assumed to be the same as the one of the house), age (30 or 40 years), income
(2000 or 4000 monthly net income), job type (fixed-term employee, employee
with permanent contract or self-employed), mortgage LTV at origination (50,
60, 80 or 85 per cent), original maturity (10, 15, 20 or 30 years) and rate
type (fixed or adjustable). Contract terms offered by banks via the platform
are binding, provided that the information submitted by the borrower in the
online application is accurate. Rates offered online are representative of the
real market and have a high predictive power for the actual price of fixed-rate
mortgages at the individual bank level (Carella et al. 2020). This alleviates
potential concerns about the lender posting teaser rates through the broker,
and reassure us on the reliability of my dataset. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 summarize
these data. Although the Italian mortgage market is characterized by rela-
tively homogeneous and plain-vanilla products, data from the online platform
exhibit a significant degree of dispersion in the rate that lenders offer for iden-
tical loan and borrower types. Much of this dispersion (adjusted R-squared
higher than 80 per cent) is explained by the mortgage LTV, maturity and
rate type (Fig. A.1 in Appendix A).20 Holding contract characteristics con-
stant, the average price dispersion is 10 basis points according to MO; while
the average differential from the minimum price that an identical borrower, in
the same market and on the same day, obtains for a mortgage with the same
characteristics (LTV, maturity and rate type) is 54 basis points, corresponding
to 1,000 euro of extra interests, or 4 per cent of the total interests payments
made over the entire duration of the loan.21
Finally, I include information on selected bank balance sheet items (total
assets, marketing expenses, cost-to-income ratio, capital ratio, liquidity ratio,
non-performing loans ratio, risk-weighted assets and return on assets) from
20This pattern holds across different countries, including the US and the UK (Michelangeli
& Sette 2016; Benetton 2018; Robles-Garcia 2019).
21All estimates are based on 2018 data from MO and considering an average annual per-
centage rate from the Credit Register of about 2 per cent, a 20 year maturity mortgage
with 60 per cent LTV and 200,000 euro house value, in line with the empirical evidence
based on the Survey on Italian Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
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Supervisory Reports and banks’ balance sheets; data on the distribution of
physical branches by bank and province available from the Statistical Database
of the Bank of Italy; and the brand popularity index from Google Trend.
Overall, the combination of these five sources of information provides me with a
very rich, loan-level dataset that is ideal for analyzing the effects of branding on
households’ choice behaviour. This paper is the first to exploit these combined
datasets to address the role of brand name in the Italian residential mortgage
market.
1.3 Descriptive Analysis
I hereby provide supporting evidence to the claim that the rebranding does
not alter the choice set of the consumer, who keeps choosing among the exact
same menu of mortgage products and prices. The rebranding group operates
in several provinces through different individual banks, each of which follows
the same offering and pricing policy defined at the headquarter level.22 Figure
1.1 in relies on data from the online platform to illustrate the offering policy of
banks belonging to the rebranding group. In particular, in each province, the
map shows the number of products offered by the individual bank responsible
for that province. I identify 32 products in total, where each product is a
combination of the characteristics that account for the main source of varia-
tion in the offered APR: the mortgage LTV, the maturity and the rate type.
Product differentiation is the same for each bank belonging to the group, and
there is no geographical overlapping among them. To be precise, the parent
brand targets dark blue provinces with 32 out of 32 potential products; the
subsidiary brand targets bright blue provinces, with 32 out of 32 products
as well; other subsidiary brands target the remaining light blue provinces and
they offer the same 32 out of 32 products too. White provinces are those where
the group does not make any online offer. As for the pricing policy, Figure
1.2 displays the APR offered by the rebranding group in treated provinces
before and after the rebranding event for different combinations of rate type,
maturity and LTV. Before the red line I observe the APR offered by the sub-
sidiary brand, after the red line the subsidiary brand is replaced by the parent
brand and I observe the APR offered by the latter. There is clearly no jump
22All group subsidiaries must follow the fund transfer pricing guidelines set by the parent
bank and very minor misalignments are allowed.
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between the APR offered by the two in treated provinces and, more in general,
across all provinces: Figure 1.3 depicts minor or no misalignment at all be-
tween the average APR across provinces offered by the subsidiary brand (solid
line, available until incorporation) and by the parent brand (dashed line), for
different combinations of rate type, LTV and maturity level. A second set
of supportive evidence comes from the distribution of physical branches by
province. Table 1.4 documents the delta in both the number and the share of
physical branches across provinces for the rebranding lender before and after
the event. I find no evidence in the data that physical branches are increasing
following the rebranding. In fact, the delta is zero for most provinces and,
if anything, is negative, meaning that the parent is almost entirely replacing
branches previously owned by the subsidiary, with no meaningful effect at the
group level. Hence, data from the digital platform confirms that households in
treated provinces after the rebranding face the same choices in term of listed
products and prices from the parent brand after the event as from the sub-
sidiary brand before the event.23 At the same time, physical presence of the
group on the territory is not strengthening, ruling out the possibility that the
equilibrium outcome reflects changes in market power due to the rebranding
strategy.
Actually, the main difference concerns consumers’ knowledge of the bank,
from small subsidiary to big parent, and her awareness of the associated brand,
from low to high. Table 1.5 reports bank characteristics for the second quarter
of 2018 (the last quarter preceding the event of study). Although the two
belong to the same group, total assets endowment is much smaller for the
subsidiary than for the parent brand; while marketing expenses (in absolute
terms) and cost-to-income ratio suggest that the parent brand both invests
more in advertising, and it is more efficient at doing so through a better man-
agement of operating costs. Capital, liquidity and profitability ratios also differ
between parent and subsidiary. As for the lender’s main competitor in treated
provinces, bank characteristics are, instead, comparable to those of the parent
bank. To proxy brand popularity, I extract the index of search volume by re-
gion from Google Trend. For given brand name, the index captures individual
search behaviour within Google browsers and YouTube, excluding repeated
search from same borrower over close periods of time. The index measures
23While I don’t have data on cross-selling strategies, I observe no change with respect to
products that are complementary to mortgages, such as insurances.
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relative brand popularity compared to the highest point (a value of 100 is the
peak popularity of the term, whilst a value of 50 means that the term is half as
popular) and it is often used to monitor marketing and brand performances.
More generally, it can be thought of as an indicator of relative ease with which
consumers expect to find content online. Figure 1.4 compares the level of
popularity in treated provinces for the parent and the subsidiary brand. As
expected, the parent enjoys superior brand popularity (this is true both at
the regional and the national level). In other words, although the pricing
and offering policies do not change, when the rebranding occurs the consumer
becomes more aware of the brand and she might so choose it. Interestingly,
search volume for the subsidiary brand does not go to zero immediately after
the event, possibly reflecting consumers’ inertia or curiosity.
In the following section I address the main question of the paper, namely
whether branding is effective at gathering consumers’ attention, and whether
it does so in a purely persuasive fashion (e.g., by creating deceptive brand loy-
alty), or rather by correcting for market inefficiencies due to imperfect house-
holds information.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Estimation and Identification
I exploit variation in brand popularity across provinces induced by a within-
group incorporation event to identify the causal effect of brand name on the
equilibrium price of mortgage contract. I rely on a Difference-in-Differences
(DID henceforth) methodology to compare the evolution of mortgage price
around the rebranding event (August 2018) in provinces with different exposure
to brand name. The rebranding is implemented through the incorporation into
the parent bank of a wholly-owned group subsidiary, and the simultaneous
rebranding of the subsidiary under the parent brand. As the parent enjoys
superior popularity, brand awareness increases in provinces exposed to the
subsidiary brand before the event and to the parent brand after. Crucially,
the within-group incorporation does not imply any policy change, as parties
involved already respond to the same headquarter, and it does not alter the
choice set of the consumer, who still face the same menu of products and prices
offered. Instead, it affects consumers’ perception of the financial intermediary
CHAPTER 1. BRAND INFORMATION VERSUS PERSUASION 22
through awareness of the corresponding brand.
Before I formally exploit this variation, and derive the resulting impact on
the equilibrium price of mortgage contracts, I look at how brand awareness
affects market share. The regression I estimate is the following:
MarketSharejt = β0 + β1POSTt + β2Treated+ β3(POSTt × Treated) + εjt (1.1)
where j indexes the lender and t the quarter. The dependent variable is the
quarterly market share of the rebranding lender in each province, Treated is
a dummy for provinces affected by the rebranding event, POSTt is a time
dummy for the event, and the regression coefficient on the interaction between
POSTt and Treated is the effect of interest.
Moving to the equilibrium mortgage price, I run my analysis using two
different benchmark criteria. The first one is at the province level, and it
compares the evolution of mortgage price in provinces where the brand becomes
more salient after the event against provinces where brand awareness remains
constant throughout the sample period. I estimate the following regression
equation:
Yjimt = β0+β1POSTt+β2Treated+β3(POSTt×Treated)+Xi+Zm+εjimt (1.2)
where j indexes the lender, i the borrower, m the mortgage contract and t the
quarter. The main outcome variable is the APR on newly originated mortgage
contracts. The time dimension of the DID is the dummy POST , which is one
starting from the third quarter of 2018 and zero before. The cross-sectional
dimension, Treated, is a dummy equal to one for provinces directly affected by
the rebranding and zero for remaining unaffected provinces. Identification of
the effect of branding is achieved because the rebranding brings an exogenous
source of variation in consumers’ brand awareness across provinces, without
altering the lenders’ pricing policy. I control for contract and borrower char-
acteristics to mitigate for potential selection bias: Xi is a vector of borrower
characteristics (age, gender, nationality, a dummy for past default and one
for first time borrowers), Zm is a vector of contract characteristics (mortgage
amount, maturity and rate type). The effect of interest is captured by the
regression coefficient on the interaction between POST and Treated. The
second criterion is at the lender level in treated provinces. It evaluates the
outcome for the rebranding lender against its main competitor, not changing
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name. The regression I estimate is:
Yjimt = β0 + β1POSTt + β2Treated+ β3(POSTt × Treated) + δ1Rebrandingj
+ δ2(POSTt ×Rebrandingj) + δ3(Treated×Rebrandingj)
+ γ1(POSTt × Treated×Rebrandingj) +Xi + Zm + εjimt (1.3)
where j indexes the lender, i the borrower, m the mortgage contract and t
the quarter. Rebranding is a dummy equal to one for the rebranding lender
and zero for the competitor. Other variables are as previously defined. The
coefficient of interest is γ1 , which controls for the possibility that the treatment
effect is driven by underlying price trends in treated provinces. If that were
the case, trends should be affecting both the competitor and the rebranding
lender equally, and the difference between the two should not be significant.
Then, to also confirm coherency of my results with standard prediction
from economic theory, I run regressions 1.2 and 1.3 using the log amount of
mortgage debt (at the contract level) as the main dependent variable, and look
at the impact of rebranding on the equilibrium quantity of mortgage contracts.
Next, I look at household’s choice behaviour as to shed lights on how brand-
ing attracts consumers. More precisely, whether it does so by lowering search
costs and allowing them to find cheaper products (informative branding), or
by creating spurious brand loyalty and persuading them into more expensive
choices (persuasive branding). I combine data on originated mortgage con-
tracts with data on mortgage offered from the digital platform and exploit full
information on the composition of the consumer’s choice set. I match the two
datasets at the product level (lender, rate type, maturity, province, and APR).
To address concerns about deceptive or unrealistic offers, I keep only quotes
that are actually realized in equilibrium. This drastically reduces the number
of observation at hands, but it also keeps the measurement error down to the
minimum. Importantly, the matching with MO data allows to get information
on the mortgage LTV, which would otherwise not be available.24 I group ho-
mogeneous mortgages contracts into bins, where each bin is a combination of
LTV, maturity and rate type, and there are 32 possible combinations in total
(defined as before).25 For each indebted borrower I observe the equilibrium
product choice, which includes her choice of the current lender and the cur-
rent contract, and I also observe the identity of the lender she borrowed from
24A full description of the LTV inference is provided in the Appendix A.
25The grouping reflects the characteristics that account for the main source of variation in
the offered APR (Figure A.1).
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within the past 20 years, together with the price offered today by that lender
in the same province, at the same time and within the same bin. Next, I rank
banks from higher to lower mortgage price within each bin, and study house-
holds’ transition across lenders in response to the rebranding shock. I assume
that cheaper mortgages are, all else equal, better products from the perspec-
tive of the consumer, and I expect households to switch to cheaper lenders if
the brand is informative, and to be driven into more expensive choices if the
brand is persuasive. I first estimate the following multivariate regression for
the household’s choice of high, medium or low-price lender:
Highjit = β0 + β1POSTt + β2Treated+ β3(POSTt × Treated) + εjit
Mediumjit = β0 + β1POSTt + β2Treated+ β3(POSTt × Treated) + εjit
Lowjit = β0 + β1POSTt + β2Treated+ β3(POSTt × Treated) + εjit
(1.4)
where j indexes the lender, i the borrower, and t the quarter. High, Medium
and Low are dummies reflecting the lender’s ranking in terms of APR within
bins. POST and Treated are defined as before. The three equations are
estimated simultaneously and the regression coefficient β3 captures the impact
of brand name on the probability of choosing a lender with a given price
ranking. Then, for each already indebted borrower, I exploit information on her
previous lending relationship and estimate the treatment effect of rebranding
on both the probability that she switches lender (1.5), and the probability that
she switches from a more to a less expensive lender (1.6).
Switcherjit = β0+β1POSTt+β2Treated+(POSTt×Treated)+Wjt+Xi+ζm+εjit
(1.5)
where j indexes the lender, i the borrower, m the mortgage contract and t
the quarter. Switcherjit is the probability that borrowers originate a mortgage
with a lender they have not borrowed from since 2000.26 Wjt is a matrix of
bank characteristics, which includes a measure of size (log total assets), capital
ratio (tier 1 capital to total assets), liquidity ratio (cash plus deposits to the
central bank and government bonds to total assets) and NPL ratio (net non-
performing loans to total loans). Xi is a vector of borrower characteristics (age,
gender, nationality, a dummy for past default and one for first time borrowers)
26For each already indebted borrower, I observe the identity of her previous lenders over the
past 18 years. If none of these corresponds to her current lender, I set Switcherjit equal
to one, zero otherwise.
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and ζm are bin fixed-effects. POST and Treated are defined as before.
Lowjit = α0 + α1Highj−1,i,t + α2Mediumj−1,i,t + β1POSTt + β2Treated
+ β3POSTt × Treated+ γ1POSTt ×Highj−1,i,t + γ2Treated×Highj−1,i,t
+ γ3POSTt × Treated×Highj−1,i,t + δ1POSTt ×Mediumj−1,i,t
+ δ2Treated×Mediumj−1,i,t + δ3POSTt × Treated×Mediumj−1,i,t
+Wjt +Xi + ζm + εjit (1.6)
where j indexes the lender, i the borrower, m the mortgage contract and
t the quarter. High, Medium and Low are dummies defined according to
the 2018 distribution of newly originated mortgage contracts, and reflect the
current (j) and previous (j − 1) lender’s ranking in terms of APR within
each bin.27 POST , Treated, Wjt, Xi and ζm are as previously defined. The
above specification, however, does not account for the possibility that branding
is always attractive, and either an informative or a persuasive effect arises
depending on whether the lender is low or high-price. To demonstrate that the
relationship between branding and the expensiveness of mortgage contracts is
not spurious, I exploit variation in the lender’s ranking within bin and estimate
the treatment effect of brand name on households’ unconditional probability
of choosing it:
Rebrandingjit = α0 + α1Highjit + α2Mediumjit + β1POSTt + β2Treated
+ β3POSTt × Treated+ γ1POSTt ×Highjit + γ2Treated×Highjit
+ γ3POSTt × Treated×Highjit + δ1POSTt ×Mediumjit
+ δ2Treated×Mediumjit + δ3POSTt × Treated×Mediumjit
+Wjt +Xi + ζm + εjit (1.7)
where j indexes the lender, i the borrower, m the mortgage contract and t the
quarter. Rebrandingjit is a dummy equal to one for contracts originated by the
rebranding lender and zero otherwise. All other variables are as before. The
claim that the benefit of branding consists in the lowering of search costs for
households that are not aware of each product’s existence boils down to saying
27I divide the within-bin distribution of the APR at the bank-level into three equal segments.
I then assign each current and previous lender a ranking reflecting their APR positioning
within the bin (Low if the APR is smaller than or equal to the 33th percentile, Medium
if the APR is between the 33rd and the 66th percentile, High if the APR is greater than
or equal to the 66th percentile). On average 25% of the banks are high-price, 35% are
medium-price, and 40% are low-price.
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that a positive effect does not arise for borrowers that are already informed.
To test this, I split the sample into old client, which are already indebted
borrowers with a previous lending relationship with the parent brand, and
switchers, which are already indebted borrowers that go to the parent brand
for the first time since 2000, and I estimate regression 1.7 separately for the
two sub-samples.
Lastly, I compute the quarterly standard deviation by province in the APR
across all bins (between standard deviation) and within the same bin (within
standard deviation), and run the following regression for the treatment effect
of brand name on price dispersion:
PriceDispersionjit = β0+β1POSTt+β2Treated+β3(POSTt×Treated)+εjit (1.8)
where PriceDispersion is the average standard deviation in the mortgage
rate by province across all bins and within the same bin. In all regressions, as
standard in the literature, I cluster errors at the province level, allowing for the
possibility that model errors in the same province (namely, some unobserved
components within clusters) are correlated, while model errors in different
provinces are assumed to be uncorrelated.
1.4.2 Estimation Results
Market Share. I start by illustrating results on the effect of rebranding on
market share. First, graphical inspection of the quarterly market share for the
rebranding and competitor lender, before and after the event (red line), shows
that the former gains almost 20 per cent market share over its competitor in
treated provinces (Figure 1.5). The market share is computed at the group
level to account for the incorporation effect. Second, the regression analysis
(Equation 1.1) points at a positive and significant treatment effect of brand
awareness on market share: the rebranding lender increases market share fol-
lowing the event (Tables 1.6 and 1.7), and the effect is statistically significant
for provinces where brand popularity increases because of the subsidiary’s re-
branding under the parent brand (Table 1.8). The result could reflect higher
market power as well as greater competitiveness of the parent. If it is market
power, I would expect the parent to enforce its dominant position and extract
surplus by steering consumers into relatively more expensive products; if it
is competitiveness, I would expect the parent to exploit its comparative ad-
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vantage and attract consumers through more convenient deals. I look at the
equilibrium mortgage price to address this question.
Equilibrium Mortgage Price. The DID identifying assumption is that the
APR would have evolved according to a parallel trend in provinces with higher
and lower brand awareness, had the rebranding not been implemented. While
this assumption is not directly testable, Figure 1.6 provides visual inspection
that, prior to the rebranding, the APR trends similarly across provinces with
different levels of brand awareness. Figure 1.7 shows the average APR across all
new mortgages issued by the rebranding and the competitor lender in treated
provinces before and after the event (red line). I observe an average reduction
in the equilibrium APR for mortgages originated by the rebranding lender after
the event, while the APR on mortgages originated by the competitor lender
continues on an increasing path ongoing from before. The DID estimator
(Equation 1.2) shows that the rebranding strategy reduces the equilibrium
APR on mortgages issued by the lender in treated provinces, and the effect
survives after conditioning for loan and borrower characteristics (Table 1.9,
columns 1 and 2). This, together with evidences presented in Section 3 (that
the offering and pricing policies of the rebranding lender are not affected by
the within-group incorporation), suggests that the rebranding shock induces
consumers’ selection into less expensive choices. As for the competitor lender
(Equation 1.3 ), who is not experiencing any change in brand popularity, I find
no effect on the price of mortgage contracts originated in treated provinces
after the event (Table 1.9, column 3). Hence, households switching to the
rebranding lender come indistinguishably from all points of the transaction
price distribution of the competitor lender, so that no aggregate effect arises for
the latter.28 Also, the treatment effect is not driven by underlying price trends
in treated provinces. If that were the case, trends should be affecting both
the competitor and the rebranding lender equally and the difference between
the two should not be significant. The coefficient for the interaction POST ,
Treated and Rebranding is significant, ruling out this possibility (Table 1.9,
column 4). In fact, the treatment effect becomes stronger after netting out
the evolution of price for the competitor lender, actually increasing in treated
provinces (Figure 1.7).
28Table A.3 in Appendix A shows no statistically significant difference in the ranking of
their previous intermediary for borrowers that switch to the rebranding lender.
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Equilibrium Mortgage Quantity. I replicate the DID model (Equations
1.2 and 1.3) to also estimate the effect of brand name on the equilibrium
amount of mortgage debt (outcome variable). Mortgage credit issued by the
rebranding lender in treated provinces increases following the event, consis-
tently with a downward sloping demand (Table 1.10). The effect survives
after conditioning for loan and borrower characteristics (columns 1 and 2).
The rebranding strategy does not affect the equilibrium amount of mortgage
credit granted by the competitor lender in treated provinces, excluding the
possibility that households entirely substitute products of the competitor with
those of the rebranding lender (column 3). Also, the difference between the
rebranding and the competitor lender is still significant, meaning that the ef-
fect is not spuriously driven by the evolution of mortgage demand in treated
provinces (column 4). Given the observed reduction in the equilibrium mort-
gage price (Table 1.9), the effect on quantity is as expected and in line with
classic microeconomics theory posing a negative relationship between the quan-
tity demanded of a good and its price.
Household choice. Results presented so far already denote some kind of
households’ selection into cheaper products due to the rebranding. In what
follows, I investigate patterns of such selection to show that this is unlikely to
reflect pure substitution behaviours by the household in favour of the lender
whose name is more salient, and instead it mirrors a better understanding of
the most convenient option and a higher incentive to reallocate towards less
expensive intermediaries. Unlike before, the matching with MO allows to ef-
fectively control for contract and borrower characteristics and confirms that,
following the rebranding, households in treated provinces are, ceteris paribus,
more likely to pick the lender with the lowest price (Equation 1.4 and Ta-
ble 1.11). As previously argued, because the price offered does not change,
this result is attributable to consumers’ selection into less expensive contracts.
To actually conclude that a selection outcome arises because the rebranding
shock increases consumers’ search for more convenient deals, I study house-
holds’ choice among lenders with different price ranking. In Equation 1.5, I
find a positive and significant treatment effect of rebranding on the proba-
bility that previously indebted borrowers switch to a new lender (Table 1.12)
and, specifically in Equation 1.6, that they switch from a previous lender now
offering a high or medium price to a current lender now offering a low price
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(Table 1.13). Nevertheless, one could still argue that the informative effect of
branding arises in this setting only because the lender whose brand is more
salient also happens to be the one with the lowest price. If the lender were
expensive, the result would be reversed and branding would be persuasive. To
shut down this criticism, and validate the hypothesis that consumers’ realloca-
tion occurs because branding induces search for cheaper options, Equation 1.7
exploits variation in the lender’s price ranking across offers.29 The idea being
the following: if brand is informative, households should select the rebranding
lender only when the latter makes low-priced offers and abstain from doing so
when it ranks high or medium. I estimate the treatment effect of brand name
on the probability of choosing the rebranding lender and find that households
do not fully substitute. In fact, they refrain from doing so for products where
the rebranding lender is less competitive (the two triple interaction terms in
Table 1.15 are both negative and significant). This result is inconsistent with
the persuasive view that the brand alters consumer’s preferences, leading them
into expensive choices, and instead embraces the possibility that brand helps
consumers taking more informed decision. Sample split between old clients
and switchers30 shows that the probability of choosing the rebranding lender
increases only for the latter, who have never borrowed from the parent and are
therefore likely to be less aware of its brand (Table 1.16). Old client, instead,
already know the brand, and rebranding brings virtually no value to them.
Price Dispersion. I document a decrease in price dispersion by province
across all bins (between standard deviation) and within the same bin (within
standard deviation) (Tables 1.17-1.20) and find a negative 1 basis point and sig-
nificant treatment effect of rebranding on price dispersion in treated provinces
(Equation 1.8 and Table 1.22). As the searching process becomes more effi-
cient, there might be less scope for discretionary price setting by the lender,
and dispersion in the price of homogeneous products may go down, consis-
tently with the law of one price and the hypothesis that branding ameliorates
market inefficiencies due to imperfect consumers’ information.
29Table 1.14 illustrates that the price ranking of the rebranding lender is not always constant,
which makes it possible to disentangle households’ response to brand name depending on
the competitiveness of the offer.
30Old clients are already indebted borrowers that have a previous lending relationship with
the parent brand. Switchers are already indebted borrowers that go to the parent brand
for the first time since 2000.
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1.5 Conclusions
Many markets are characterized by imperfect consumers’ information with
respect to product alternatives. My analysis focuses on the role that brand
popularity plays in correcting distortions linked to this imperfection. Using a
unique dataset that combines information on mortgage offers from the main
Italian online broker, and mortgage originated from the Credit Register over
the period 2018Q1 to 2018Q4, I study the relationship between brand name
and the price of mortgage contracts obtained by households. I exploit variation
in brand name across provinces induced by a within-group rebranding event
that involves one of the leading mortgage lender in Italy. The set of evidence
collected in this paper is inconsistent with brand persuasion, for which lenders
exploit brand name to drive uninformed consumers into expensive choices,
and instead supports the informative view that brand induces households’
reallocation towards cheaper mortgages. It does so by increasing awareness of
potential improvements in products offered, while also reducing the extent to
which borrowers overpay relative to the rates available on the market. Yet,
the limited time horizon does not exclude the possibility that lenders exploit
the information effect and gain market share in the short term, to then steer
consumers into expensive choices in the longer term.
My result well relates to today’s policy issues and suggests that if bank
consolidation brings better offers, under price competition, those improvements
are best attained when consolidating banks rely on the more popular brand to
reach less informed clients.
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1.6 Tables
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: originated mortgage contracts (All Sample)
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mortgage amount (e) 125,916 131,155 43,022 80,000 300,000
Fixed-rate (%) 115,573 2.12 0.61 0.36 6.84
Adjustable-rate (%) 10,343 1.75 0.77 0.28 6.24
Mortgage maturity 125,916 22 5.51 10 30
Borrower age 125,916 38 6.44 18 50
Mortgage rate by location
North-West 42,220 2.07 0.64 0.28 6.43
North-East 24,588 2.02 0.63 0.32 6.84
Center 28,605 2.11 0.60 0.44 6.72
South 30,503 2.16 0.63 0.40 6.37
Percentage share
Rate type Fixed-rate 91.79
Adjustable-rate 8.21
Borrower sex Male 61.96
Female 38.04
Borrower nationality UE 96.73
Extra-UE 3.27




Note: The table reports summary statistics for new mortgage contracts originated in Italy
in the period from 2018Q1 to 2018Q4. Source: CR and TAXIA.
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Table 1.2: Probability of mortgage offer





10 years maturity 23.75
15 years maturity 24.91
20 years maturity 26.06






30 years old 25.24
40 years old 25.24
e2000 net monthly income 24.15








Note: The table reports information on the probability of observing on online mortgage
offer by one of the 30 partner banks in the period from March to December 2018 for selected
profiles, defined by combinations of the following contract and borrower characteristics:
mortgage rate type (fixed or adjustable), original maturity (10, 15, 20 or 30 years), LTV
at origination (50, 60, 80 or 85 per cent); borrower age (30 or 40 years), income (2000
or 4000 monthly net income), job type (fixed-term employee, employee with permanent
contract or self-employed) and location (North-West, North-East, Center, South). Source:
MutuiOnline.
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of mortgage offers
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mortgage amount (e) 6,182,580 120,000 0 120,000 120,000
Mortgage instalment (e) 6,182,580 577 197 291 1015
FRM (%) 3,075,676 2.04 0.55 0.94 4.72
ARM (%) 3,106,904 1.19 0.56 0.43 3.80
Mortgage maturity 6,182,580 19 7.40 10 30
Mortgage LTV 6,182,580 63.60 12.70 50 85
Mortgage rate by maturity
10 years 1,454,824 1.43 0.62 0.43 4.43
15 years 1,525,560 1.55 0.66 0.43 4.41
20 years 1,596,132 1.60 0.70 0.54 4.41
30 years 1,606,064 1.85 0.76 0.54 4.72
Mortgage rate by LTV
50 per cent 2,044,188 1.48 0.65 0.43 4.52
60 per cent 2,042,020 1.57 0.62 0.57 4.72
80 per cent 1,936,116 1.67 0.64 0.56 4.70
85 per cent 160,256 3.27 0.94 2.00 4.43
Mortgage rate by location
North-West 1,650,588 1.61 0.68 0.43 4.72
North-East 1,332,576 1.63 0.69 0.44 4.72
Center 1,315,328 1.62 0.74 0.44 4.72
South 1,884,088 1.62 0.71 0.44 4.72
Mortgage rate by borrower age
30 years old 3,091,290 1.61 0.70 0.43 4.72
40 years old 3,091,290 1.61 0.70 0.43 4.72
Mortgage rate by borrower income
e2000 (monthly net) 2,957,948 1.62 0.70 0.43 4.72
e4000 (monthly net) 3,224,632 1.60 0.70 0.43 4.72
Mortgage rate by employment status
Fixed-term contract 645,984 1.54 0.76 0.43 4.43
Permanent contract 2,768,298 1.62 0.69 0.43 4.72
Self-employed 2,768,298 1.62 0.69 0.43 4.72
Note: The table reports summary statistics for online mortgage offers by the 30 partner
banks in the period from March to December 2018. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Table 1.4: Distribution of physical branches of the rebranding lender by province
Provinces Treated Number of Physical Branches % Share of Physical Branches
Pre-Rebranding Post-Rebranding Delta Pre-Rebranding Post-Rebranding Delta
1 Gorizia Y 85 85 0 13 13 0
2 Pordenone Y 32 31 -1 12 12 0
3 Trieste Y 165 163 -2 19 19 0
4 Udine Y 15 11 -4 15 12 -4
5 Verona N 18 18 0 21 21 0
6 Vicena N 43 43 0 11 11 0
7 Belluno N 233 232 -1 15 15 0
8 Padova N 27 27 0 6 6 0
9 Rovigo N 79 78 -1 20 21 1
10 Torino N 106 105 -1 20 20 0
11 Aosta N 65 65 0 19 19 0
12 Genova N 194 195 1 12 12 0
13 Milano N 159 159 0 24 25 0
14 Trento N 12 12 0 9 9 0
15 Venezia N 11 11 0 12 12 0
16 Bologna N 66 66 0 16 16 0
17 Ancona N 14 14 0 9 9 0
18 Firenze N 13 13 0 15 15 0
19 Perugia N 42 35 -7 13 11 -2
20 Roma N 25 25 0 21 21 0
21 Napoli N 10 10 0 9 9 0
22 L’Aquila N 42 40 -2 25 24 -1
23 Campobasso N 25 24 -1 6 5 0
24 Bari N 17 17 0 12 12 0
25 Potenza N 27 23 -4 12 11 -2
26 Catanzaro N 15 15 0 17 17 0
27 Palermo N 15 15 0 10 11 0
28 Cagliari N 3 3 0 3 3 0
29 Vercelli N 61 61 0 17 17 0
30 Novara N 58 58 0 18 18 0
31 Cuneo N 6 6 0 5 5 0
32 Asti N 78 78 0 13 13 0
33 Alessandria N 61 61 0 8 8 0
34 Imperia N 53 53 0 19 19 0
35 Savona N 24 24 0 10 10 0
36 La Spezia N 25 25 0 9 9 0
37 Varese N 21 21 0 6 6 0
38 Como N 74 61 -13 13 11 -2
39 Sondrio N 136 114 -22 27 24 -3
40 Bergamo N 36 28 -8 26 21 -4
41 Brescia N 135 119 -16 29 26 -2
42 Pavia N 148 122 -26 29 25 -3
43 Cremona N 47 39 -8 35 31 -4
44 Mantova N 79 68 -11 20 17 -2
45 Bolzano N 20 15 -5 24 20 -4
46 Treviso N 37 28 -9 21 17 -4
47 Piacenza N 12 12 0 7 7 0
48 Parma N 54 54 0 19 19 0
49 Reggio Emilia N 16 16 0 5 5 0
50 Modena N 31 31 0 8 8 0
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Provinces Treated Number of Physical Branches % Share of Physical Branches
Pre-Rebranding Post-Rebranding Delta Pre-Rebranding Post-Rebranding Delta
51 Ferrara N 12 12 0 7 7 0
52 Ravenna N 21 21 0 8 8 0
53 Forli’ N 43 43 0 16 16 0
54 Pesaro Urbino N 26 26 0 12 12 0
55 Macerata N 17 17 0 9 9 0
56 Ascoli Piceno N 26 26 0 21 21 0
57 Massa Carrara N 9 9 0 10 10 0
58 Lucca N 27 27 0 13 13 0
59 Pistoia N 39 39 0 28 28 0
60 Livorno N 17 17 0 9 10 1
61 Pisa N 26 26 0 10 10 0
62 Arezzo N 39 39 0 19 20 0
63 Siena N 23 23 0 13 13 0
64 Grosseto N 23 23 0 16 17 0
65 Terni N 23 23 0 22 22 0
66 Viterbo N 33 33 0 19 19 0
67 Rieti N 27 26 -1 40 39 -1
68 Latina N 14 14 0 9 9 0
69 Frosinone N 17 17 0 10 10 0
70 Caserta N 41 41 0 25 25 0
71 Benevento N 10 10 0 12 13 0
72 Avellino N 19 19 0 17 17 0
73 Salerno N 49 49 0 15 15 0
74 Teramo N 27 27 0 18 18 0
75 Pescara N 14 14 0 10 11 0
76 Chieti N 15 15 0 10 10 0
77 Isernia N 4 4 0 17 17 0
78 Foggia N 28 28 0 15 15 0
79 Taranto N 19 19 0 14 14 0
80 Brindisi N 21 21 0 20 20 0
81 Lecce N 33 33 0 14 14 0
82 Matera N 9 9 0 12 12 0
83 Cosenza N 22 22 0 13 13 0
84 Reggio Calabria N 22 22 0 22 22 0
85 Trapani N 28 26 -2 22 21 -1
86 Messina N 25 24 -1 15 15 0
87 Agrigento N 14 13 -1 11 11 -1
88 Caltanissetta N 11 9 -2 14 12 -2
89 Enna N 10 9 -1 18 17 -2
90 Catania N 17 17 0 7 7 0
91 Ragusa N 10 10 0 11 11 0
92 Siracusa N 10 10 0 10 10 0
93 Sassari N 28 28 0 16 16 0
94 Nuoro N 8 8 0 10 10 0
95 Oristano N 4 4 0 6 6 0
96 Lodi N 16 16 0 12 12 0
97 Monza N 45 45 0 12 12 0
98 Fermo N 10 10 0 11 12 0
99 BAT N 17 17 0 16 17 0
100 Barletta Andria Trani N 32 32 0 33 33 1
101 Crotone N 2 2 0 6 6 0
102 Biella N 7 7 0 6 6 0
103 Verbania N 21 21 0 31 32 1
104 Lecco N 23 23 0 10 11 0
105 Rimini N 20 20 0 9 9 0
106 Vibo Valentia N 6 6 0 20 20 0
Note: The table lists the average number and share of physical branches by province of
the rebranding lender (at the group level) in the two quarters preceding and following the
rebranding event, and computes the delta between the two periods. Treated provinces are
those exposed to the subsidiary brand before the event and to the parent brand after. Source:
Bank of Italy Statistical Database and authors’ calculation.
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Table 1.5: Bank characteristics before rebranding (2018 Q2)
VARIABLES Units Subsidiary Brand Parent Brand Competitor Brand
Total Assets billions Euro 5.98 536 437
Marketing Expenes millions Euro 0.08 81 77
CTI % of Net Income 68.9 41.2 43.6
T1 ratio % of Total Assets 14.5 15.3 25.1
NPL ratio % of Total Loans 17.0 14.0 13.3
Liquidity Ratio % of Total Assets 0.80 3.60 10.4
RWA % of Total Assets 29.3 49.1 46.1
ROA % of Total Assets 0.00 0.52 0.68
Note: The table compares selected bank’s balance sheet items for the subsidiary, parent and
competitor brands at the latest available date before the rebranding event. For marketing
expenditure the latest values available from the subsidiary bank’s balance sheet is as of
December 2017. All other items are as of 2018 Q2. Source: Supervisory Reports and banks’
balance sheets.
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Market share
Table 1.6: All sample
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-Rebranding 215 49.30 24.72 3.95 87.37
Post-Rebranding 214 52.60 20.31 1.90 84.37
Table 1.7: Treated Provinces
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-Rebranding 8 36.62 19.97 8.51 64.93
Post-Rebranding 8 54.31 12.93 34.48 77.59
Note: The tables report the quarterly market share of the rebranding group for new mort-
gage originations in my entire sample and in treated provinces only, for the two quarters
preceding and following the rebranding event. Treated provinces are those exposed to the
subsidiary brand before the event and to the parent brand after. Pre and post periods are
the two quarters preceding and following the rebranding event. Source: TAXIA
Table 1.8: Brand name on market share
(1) (2)











Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the quarterly market share of the rebranding group for new
mortgage originations in each province. Pre and post periods are the two quarters preceding
and following the rebranding event. All values are in percentage points. Source: TAXIA
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Equilibrium Mortgage Price
Table 1.9: Brand name on the equilibrium mortgage APR
Rebranding Lender Competitor Lender All Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Mortgage APR Mortgage APR Mortgage APR Mortgage APR
POST 0.0293*** 0.0423*** 0.0163*** 0.0241***
(0.00495) (0.00352) (0.00465) (0.00498)
Treated 0.0862** 0.00890 -0.105*** -0.119***
(0.0338) (0.0239) (0.0186) (0.0219)
POST × Treated -0.0373* -0.0356** 0.0102 0.0136
(0.0199) (0.0144) (0.00915) (0.0108)




POST × Rebranding 0.0180***
(0.00594)
Treated × Rebranding 0.148***
(0.0381)
POST × Treated × Rebranding -0.0529**
(0.0235)
Contract characteristics N Y Y Y
Borrower characteristics N Y Y Y
Observations 65,107 63,665 60,068 123,723
R-squared 0.001 0.625 0.684 0.628
Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: in columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the percentage interest rate on mort-
gage contracts originated by the rebranding group. In column (3) the dependent variable
is the percentage interest rate on mortgage contracts originated by the competitor group.
In column (4) the dependent variable is the percentage interest rate on both mortgage con-
tracts originated by the rebranding and the competitor lenders (both at the group level).
Rebranding is a dummy equal to one for the lender implementing a rebranding strategy and
zero for the competitor lender. Contract characteristics include mortgage amount, rate type
and maturity. Borrower characteristics include age, gender, nationality, a dummy for past
default and one for first-time borrowers. Data are quarterly.
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Equilibrium Mortgage Quantity
Table 1.10: Brand name on equilibrium mortgage debt
Rebranding Lender Competitor Lender All Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log Mortgage debt log Mortgage debt log Mortgage debt log Mortgage debt
POST 0.0242*** 0.0178*** 0.00496*** 0.00511***
(0.00338) (0.00243) (0.00162) (0.00157)
Treated -0.0481* -0.0402* -0.00247 -0.00325
(0.0247) (0.0222) (0.00730) (0.00768)
POST × Treated 0.0345** 0.0284** -0.00203 -0.00200
(0.0158) (0.0134) (0.00471) (0.00496)




POST × Rebranding 0.0137***
(0.00235)
POST × Treated -0.0338
(0.0243)
POST × Rebranding × Treated 0.0295*
(0.0153)
Contract characteristics N Y Y Y
Borrower characteristics N Y Y Y
Observations 65,107 63,665 60,068 123,723
R-squared 0.002 0.890 0.918 0.901
Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: in columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the log amount of mortgage debt
on contracts originated by the rebranding group. In column (3) the dependent variable is
the is the log amount of mortgage debt on contracts originated by the competitor group. In
column (4) the dependent variable is the log amount of mortgage debt on mortgage contracts
originated by the competitor and the rebranding lender (both at the group level). Rebrand-
ing is a dummy equal to one for the lender implementing a rebranding strategy and zero for
the competitor lender. POST is a time dummy equal to one starting from the third quarter
of 2018 and zero before. Treated is a dummy variable equal to one for provinces provinces
directly affected by the rebranding and zero for remaining unaffected provinces. Contract
characteristics include mortgage amount, rate type and maturity. Borrower characteristics
include age, gender, nationality, a dummy for past default and one for first-time borrowers.
Data are quarterly.
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Household Choice
Table 1.11: Multivariate regression: Household’s choice of lender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES High Medium Low High Medium Low
POST -0.0769*** 0.186*** -0.109*** -0.0815*** 0.187*** -0.105***
(0.0116) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0116) (0.0170) (0.0169)
Treated 0.157*** -0.0185 -0.139** 0.155*** -0.0122 -0.143**
(0.0391) (0.0570) (0.0566) (0.0390) (0.0572) (0.0567)
POST × Treated -0.117** -0.154** 0.271*** -0.128** -0.151** 0.279***
(0.0523) (0.0762) (0.0758) (0.0522) (0.0766) (0.0760)
Bin FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718
R-squared 0.041 0.066 0.041 0.021 0.034 0.012
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: High, Medium and Low are dummies defined according to the 2018 distribution of
newly originated mortgage contracts, and reflect the current lender’s ranking in terms of
APR within bin. Bins are combinations of mortgage LTV, maturity and rate type. POST
is a time dummy equal to one starting from the third quarter of 2018 and zero before.
Treated is a dummy variable equal to one for provinces provinces directly affected by the
rebranding and zero for remaining unaffected provinces. Data are quarterly.
Table 1.12: Household’s probability of switching lender
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Switching Switching Switching
POST -0.0860*** -0.0633*** -0.0616***
(0.0160) (0.0164) (0.0162)
Treated -0.206*** -0.260*** -0.301***
(0.0445) (0.0538) (0.0514)




Bin FE Y Y N
Bank characteristics N Y Y
Borrower characteristics N Y Y
Observations 3,236 3,145 3,145
R-squared 0.053 0.211 0.187
Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for indebted borrowers that originate a mortgage
with a lender they have not borrowed from in the past 20 years. POST is a time dummy
equal to one starting from the third quarter of 2018 and zero before. Treated is a dummy
variable equal to one for provinces directly affected by the rebranding and zero for remaining
unaffected provinces. Branches is the lender’s share of physical branches by province. Bins
are combinations of mortgage LTV, maturity and rate type. Bank characteristics include
size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio and NPL ratio. Borrower characteristics include age, gen-
der, nationality, and a dummy for past default. Data are quarterly.
CHAPTER 1. BRAND INFORMATION VERSUS PERSUASION 41
Table 1.13: Household’s transition to cheaper lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Current Low Current Low Current Low Current Low Current Low Current Low
Previous High -0.264** -0.273** -0.250** -0.281** -0.290** -0.253**
(0.0463) (0.0481) (0.0693) (0.0542) (0.0552) (0.0618)
Previous Medium -0.289*** -0.288*** -0.193* -0.311*** -0.309*** -0.196*
(0.0285) (0.0233) (0.0611) (0.0322) (0.0285) (0.0634)
Branches -0.170* -0.0573 -0.0726 -0.154 -0.0510 -0.0689
(0.0684) (0.0635) (0.0922) (0.108) (0.0726) (0.0937)
POST -0.0376 0.0209 -0.0251 0.0509
(0.0401) (0.0559) (0.0406) (0.0467)
Treated -0.181* 0.0268 -0.200 0.00934
(0.0769) (0.0969) (0.0963) (0.122)
POST × Treated 0.172** -0.0962 0.187** -0.0901
(0.0353) (0.0888) (0.0528) (0.107)
Previous High × POST -0.0219 -0.0444
(0.0600) (0.0466)
Previous High × Treated -0.250* -0.243*
(0.103) (0.0896)
Previous High × POST × Treated 0.215* 0.203*
(0.0843) (0.0781)
Previous Medium × POST -0.145 -0.174
(0.114) (0.0998)
Previous Medium × Treated -0.347* -0.364*
(0.123) (0.133)
Previous Medium × POST × Treated 0.548** 0.586**
(0.166) (0.152)
Bin FE Y Y Y N N N
Bank chacacteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Borrower chacacteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,145 3,145 3,145 3,145 3,145 3,145
R-squared 0.262 0.228 0.233 0.245 0.210 0.217
Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the current lender is low-price and
zero otherwise. High, Medium and Low are dummies defined according to the 2018 distri-
bution of newly originated mortgage contracts, and reflect the current and previous lender’s
ranking in terms of APR within bin. Bins are combinations of mortgage LTV, maturity and
rate type. POST is a time dummy equal to one starting from the third quarter of 2018 and
zero before. Treated is a dummy variable equal to one for provinces directly affected by the
rebranding and zero for remaining unaffected provinces. Branches is the lender’s share of
physical branches by province. Bank characteristics include size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio
and NPL ratio. Borrower characteristics include age, gender, nationality, and a dummy for
past default. First-time borrowers are excluded. Category excluded is the previous lender
with Low price ranking. Data are quarterly.
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Table 1.14: Share of low-priced offers by the rebranding lender in treated provinces by bin
Bins 10 years maturity 15 years maturity 20 years maturity 30 years maturity
ARM with 50% LTV 100% 100% 80% 100%
FRM with 50% LTV 0% 0% 0% 20%
ARM with 60% LTV 100% 100% 80% 0%
FRM with 60% LTV 0% 0% 0% 0%
ARM with 80% LTV 100% 100% 80% 100%
FRM with 80% LTV 0% 0% 0% 20%
ARM with 85% LTV 100% 100% 100% 100%
FRM with 85% LTV 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note: Green cells are bins where the lender’s price ranking is not constant across all offers.
Blue cells are bins where the lender always makes low-price offers. Grey cells are bins where
the lender is the only one making an offer. This are loans with LTV above 80 % are fairly
uncommon because they are penalized by regulation, as banks that offer those kind of loans
need to hold extra capital. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Table 1.15: Household’s choice of rebranding vs competitor lender (unconditional proba-
bility)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Rebranding Rebranding Rebranding Rebranding Rebranding Rebranding
High -0.364*** -0.661*** -0.445* -0.444*** -0.741*** -0.448
(0.0336) (0.0285) (0.183) (0.0345) (0.0174) (0.216)
Medium 0.183*** -0.429** -0.319 0.152*** -0.441* -0.277
(0.0321) (0.127) (0.201) (0.0316) (0.150) (0.209)
Treated -0.309*** -0.620*** -0.237** -0.396*** -0.709*** -0.237**
(0.0585) (0.0683) (0.0470) (0.0605) (0.0496) (0.0525)
POST 0.0250 -0.715*** -0.321** 0.0462* -0.698*** -0.261**
(0.0230) (0.0469) (0.0788) (0.0246) (0.0419) (0.0639)
POST × Treated 0.119* 0.620*** 0.252** 0.128* 0.666*** 0.226*
(0.0659) (0.0757) (0.0675) (0.0734) (0.0651) (0.0751)
High × POST 0.766*** 0.477** 0.791*** 0.500**
(0.0684) (0.108) (0.0519) (0.128)
High × Treated 0.665*** 0.407** 0.709*** 0.406**
(0.0688) (0.0904) (0.0496) (0.114)
High × POST× Treated -0.653*** -0.525** -0.760*** -0.591*
(0.0786) (0.136) (0.0682) (0.201)
Medium × POST 1.203*** 0.574* 1.195*** 0.506
(0.146) (0.234) (0.172) (0.248)
Medium × Treated 0.608*** 0.305** 0.632*** 0.276**
(0.0628) (0.0613) (0.0518) (0.0794)
Medium × POST× Treated -0.805*** -0.427** -0.869*** -0.397**
(0.0965) (0.107) (0.0611) (0.121)
Branches 0.0711* 0.0764*
(0.0297) (0.0323)
Bin FE Y Y Y N N N
Bank chacacteristics N N Y N N Y
Borrower chacacteristics N N Y N N Y
Observations 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718 3,718
R-squared 0.197 0.428 0.689 0.120 0.359 0.672
Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for mortgage contracts originated
with the rebranding group and zero otherwise. High, Medium and Low are dummies defined
according to the 2018 distribution of newly originated mortgage contracts, and reflect the
current lender’s ranking in terms of APR within bin. Bins are combinations of mortgage
LTV, maturity and rate type. POST is a time dummy equal to one starting from the third
quarter of 2018 and zero before. Treated is a dummy variable equal to one for provinces
affected by the rebranding and zero otherwise. Branches is the lender’s share of physical
branches by province. Bank characteristics include size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio and
NPL ratio. Borrower characteristics include age, gender, nationality, and a dummy for past
default. First-time borrowers are excluded. Category excluded is the lender with Low price
ranking. Data are quarterly.
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Table 1.16: Household’s choice of rebranding vs competitor lender (conditional probabil-
ity)
Old clients Switchers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Rebranding Rebranding Rebranding Rebranding
High -0.267*** -0.240*** 0.0502 0.0264
(0.0681) (0.0714) (0.0989) (0.104)
Medium -0.0576 -0.0597 0.0910** 0.0864**
(0.0493) (0.0456) (0.0348) (0.0354)
Time 0.122*** 0.121*** -0.119*** -0.111***
(0.0310) (0.0299) (0.0271) (0.0259)
Treated -0.181*** -0.204*** -0.338*** -0.329***
(0.0456) (0.0468) (0.108) (0.104)
POST × Treated -0.0739 -0.0830 0.281*** 0.276***
(0.117) (0.121) (0.0976) (0.0966)
Branches 0.0467*** 0.0512*** 0.0890*** 0.0933***
(0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0166) (0.0169)
Bin FE Y N Y N
Bank chacacteristics Y Y Y Y
Borrower chacacteristics Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,164 2,164 1,554 1,554
R-squared 0.481 0.466 0.296 0.283
Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for mortgage contracts originated
with the group implementing a rebranding strategy. Old clients are indebted borrowers with
a previous lending relationship with the parent brand. Switchers are indebted borrowers that
go to the parent brand for the first time since 2000. High, Medium and Low are dummies
defined according to the 2018 distribution of newly originated mortgage contracts, and reflect
the current lender’s ranking in terms of APR within bin. Bins are combinations of mortgage
LTV, maturity and rate type. POST is a time dummy equal to one starting from the third
quarter of 2018 and zero before. Treated is a dummy variable equal to one for provinces
directly affected by the rebranding and zero for remaining unaffected provinces. Branches
is the lender’s share of physical branches by province. Bank characteristics include size,
capital ratio, liquidity ratio and NPL ratio. Borrower characteristics include age, gender,
nationality, and a dummy for past default. First-time borrowers are excluded. Category
excluded is the lender with Low price ranking. Data are quarterly.
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Price Dispersion
Across bins
Table 1.17: All sample
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-Rebranding 169 .336 .019 0 1.04
Post-Rebranding 183 .324 .018 0 1.13
Table 1.18: Treated Provinces
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-Rebranding 8 .470 .017 0.20 0.71
Post-Rebranding 8 .342 .206 0 0.661
Note: The tables summarize the quarterly standard deviation in the mortgage rate by
province across all bins. Bins are combinations of mortgage LTV, maturity and rate type.
Pre and post periods are the two quarters preceding and following the rebranding event.
Treated provinces are those exposed to the subsidiary brand before the event and to the
parent brand after. Source: TAXIA, CR and MutuiOnline.
Within bin
Table 1.19: All sample
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-Rebranding 135 .096 .139 0 .562
Post-Rebranding 153 .076 .079 0 .415
Table 1.20: Treated Provinces
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-Rebranding 8 .086 .141 0 .357
Post-Rebranding 8 .056 .083 0 .293
Note: The tables summarize the quarterly standard deviation in the mortgage rate by
province holding bins constant. Bins are combinations of mortgage LTV, maturity and rate
type. Pre and post periods are the two quarters preceding and following the rebranding
event. Treated provinces are those exposed to the subsidiary brand before the event and to
the parent brand after. Source: TAXIA, CR and MutuiOnline.
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Table 1.21: Price Dispersion
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Between St. Dev. 352 .33 .18 0 1.13
Within St. Dev. 288 .09 .11 0 .56
Note: The table summarizes the quarterly dispersion in the mortgage rate by province
across all bins (between standard deviation) and within the same bin (within standard
deviation). Bins are combinations of mortgage LTV, maturity and rate type. Data refer
to contracts originated in the period from 2018Q1 to 2018Q4. Source: TAXIA, CR and
MutuiOnline. Note: The dependent variable is the average standard deviation in the
Table 1.22: Quarterly price dispersion by province
(1) (2)









Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
mortgage rate by province across all bins (column 1) and within the same bin (column 2).
Bins are combinations of mortgage LTV, maturity and rate type. POST is a time dummy
equal to one starting from the third quarter of 2018 and zero before. Treated is a dummy
variable equal to one for provinces directly affected by the rebranding and zero for remaining
unaffected provinces. Branches is the lender’s share of physical branches by province. Data
are quarterly.
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1.7 Figures
Offering Policy
Figure 1.1: Product offers by banks belonging to the rebranding group
Note: The map shows product offered by individual banks belonging to the rebranding
group in each province as of July 2018. A product is a combination of mortgage LTV,
maturity and rate type, and there are 32 possible combinations in total. Each bank targets
specific provinces with the same products and there is no geographical overlapping among
them. Blue provinces are served by the parent bank with 32 out of 32 product offers. Green
(treated) provinces are served by the subsidiary bank with 32 out of 32 product offers. Grey
provinces are served by other subsidiaries of the group with 32 out of 32 product offers.
White provinces are those with no online offer by the group (offers through the branch are
still possible). Source: MutuiOnline.
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Pricing Policy
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(f) FRM with 60% LTV
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(h) FRM with 85% LTV
Note: The charts plot the APR offered by the rebranding group in treated provinces for
different combinations of mortgage maturity, LTV and rate type. The red line denotes the
month of the rebranding event. Treated provinces are those exposed to the subsidiary brand
before the event and to the parent brand after. To the left of the red line, the chart displays
the APR offered by the subsidiary brand. To the right, the APR offered by the parent
brand. Source: MutuiOnline.
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(d) ARM with 85% LTV
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(h) FRM with 85% LTV
Note: The charts plot the average APR offered by the rebranding group across all provinces
for different combinations of of mortgage maturity, LTV and rate type. The solid line is
the average APR offered by the subsidiary brand, available until incorporation. The dashed
line is the average APR offered by the parent brand, available throughout my observation
sample. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Google Trend Index
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(b) 2018 average brand popularity
Note: The charts plot the index of individual search behaviour (Google Trend index) within
Google browsers and YouTube for the parent and subsidiary brands in treated provinces,
excluding repeated search from the same individual over close periods of time. The index
measures relative brand popularity compared to the highest point: a value of 100 is the
peak popularity of the term, a value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. Treated
provinces are those exposed to the subsidiary brand before the event and to the parent brand
after. Panel (a) shows the time series of the index from January 2018 to December 2018 in
treated provinces. The red line denotes the month of the rebranding event. Panel (b) shows
the 2018 average index value in treated provinces. Source: Google.
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Market Share
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(b) Control provinces
Note: The chart plots the quarterly market share of the rebranding and the competitor
lenders (both at the group level) in 2018. The red line denotes the quarter of the rebranding
event. Treated provinces are those exposed to the subsidiary brand before the event and
to the parent brand after. Control provinces are remaining unaffected provinces, exposed
to the same brand before and after the event. Panel (a) shows the average market share of
the two banking groups in treated provinces in each quarter of 2018. Panel (b) shows the
groups’ average market share in control provinces in each quarter of 2018. Source: TAXIA.
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Equilibrium Mortgage Price
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Note: The chart plots the APR on all new mortgage contracts originated by the rebranding
group in treated and control provinces in the period from March 2018 to December 2018.
The red line denotes the month of the rebranding event. The blue line denotes treated
provinces, exposed to the subsidiary brand before the event and to the parent brand after.
The green line denotes control provinces, exposed to the same brand before and after the
event. Source: TAXIA and CR.
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Time
Competitor lender Rebranding lender
Note: The chart plots the average APR on all new mortgage contracts originated in treated
provinces by the rebranding and by the competitor lender (both at the group level) in the
period from March 2018 to December 2018. The red line denotes the month of the rebrand-
ing event. Treated provinces are those exposed to the subsidiary brand before the event and
to the parent brand after. Source: TAXIA and CR.
2. Households’ choice of financial
intermediary within a life-cycle model
2.1 Introduction
With the empirical evidence from the previous chapter in mind, we develop a
theoretical framework to evaluate the value added of informative brands. We
quantify the effect of brand name on consumers’ search costs and households’
transition across lenders within a life-cycle model. Our model is well cali-
brated to replicate main features of the Italian household sector and to match
the level of dispersion in the price of mortgage products encountered in the
data. We focus on previously indebted borrowers and their choice of either
remaining with the current financial intermediary, or moving to a different one
with a lower price.1 Moving requires some initial searching effort and deter-
mines all the future streams of mortgage payments to be made by the borrower.
More precisely, if the household puts zero effort (say, because time constraints
or search costs are too high), she ends up paying mortgage instalments at a
premium for the entire duration of the loan.2 In each period, the household
also makes consumption and portfolio choices under uncertainty about survival
probabilities, income realizations and capital returns.3 We compare two differ-
ent scenarios. In the first one (no rebranding), households are exposed to the
same brand before and after the event. In the second one (rebranding), house-
holds are exposed to the subsidiary brand before the event, and to the parent
brand after. We rank intermediaries in terms of price (high, medium and low)
and derive the transition matrices of borrowers across lenders with different
rankings. Then, we let households reallocate from one intermediary to the
1Recourse to mortgage renegotiations has been recently increasing in Italy, after the intro-
duction of regulatory incentives in 2008, and is about 17 per cent of new loans origination
in 2018 (Attinà & Michelangeli 2020).
2The premium could reflect consumer’s inertia, inattention, loyalty, lack of information or
other search frictions (Delgado-Ballester & Munuera-Alemán 2001; Banerjee & Bandyopad-
hyay 2003; White & Yanamandram 2004; Lewis & Soureli 2006; Su 2009; De Clippel et al.
2014; Ericson 2014; Miravete & Palacios-Huerta 2014; Andersen et al. 2015; Matějka &
McKay 2015; Seenivasan et al. 2016; Ho et al. 2017; Ozdemir et al. 2020).
3Including these sources of uncertainty is necessary to replicate within the model the limited
share of households investing in risky assets that we observe in the data.
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other according to the transition probabilities observed in affected provinces
before (control scenario) and after (treatment scenario) the lender takes on
a more popular name. Our calibration delivers initial values for borrowers’
overpayments and search costs that match those of related studies for other
countries.4
Following the event, the share of households that move to an intermedi-
ary with a lower price increases by more than 9 percentage points (from 16
per cent to roughly 26 per cent). For our model to replicate this figure, the
corresponding decline in consumers’ search costs amounts to 330 euro (or 0.3
per cent of the average Italian loan).5 This lump-sum reduction captures the
direct benefit for the household, namely time saved in searching for informa-
tion and other monetary costs not incurred to visit the physical branch or to
contact the bank’s representative (say, by phone or mail). To get a comprehen-
sive estimate of the total value added for the borrower, one should also include
savings in the monthly instalments attained by moving to a cheaper lender and
collected throughout the duration of the mortgage. Taking those into account,
the household gains more than 6 per cent of the initial loan amount, equiva-
lent to 7,200 euro for an average Italian mortgage contract. Moreover, price
dispersion goes down more in treated than in untreated provinces, and the
difference (1 basis point) is consistent with the treatment effect documented
in the data.
Finally, our model delivers interesting results in terms of optimal invest-
ment choice. We find that, for a given level of consumption, investment in
risky assets decreases as the search cost goes down. Hence, the rebranding has
an impact on households’ exposure to risk in the financial market too. This
directly relies on the assumption that households are risk-averse and choose
consumption as to limit tail-risk exposure.
4Bhutta et al. (2018) estimate a gap between the 10th and 90th percentile mortgage rate
that US borrowers with the same characteristics obtain for identical loans equal to 54
bps, of which 26 bps (1.2% of the average US loan) are attributable to knowledge and
shopping (search costs account for 0.9% of the average Italian loan in our model and they
also lead to overpayment by the borrower). Allen et al. (2019) find that search frictions
reduce consumers’ surplus by 12 dollars a month in the Canadian mortgage market, and
are for 50% attributable to search costs (this percentage is at least 30% according to our
calibration).
5The average mortgage in Italy has 120,000 euro amount, 20-year maturity, 60% LTV and
200,000 euro house value.
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Related literature. This paper contributes the theoretical literature on
housing and portfolio choice within a life-cycle model (Campbell & Cocco
2015; Cocco 2005; Gomes & Michaelides 2005; Cocco et al. 2005). We study
households’ choice of financial intermediary, while accounting for their contem-
poraneous choice over consumption and risky assets. To model households’
uncertainty about future income and asset returns, we build on Barro (2006)
analysis of rare disasters during the 20th century, and Alan (2012) and Liu
et al. (2003) solution of the asset allocation problem in the presence of tail
risks. We complement existing approaches in household finance that study
the determinants of mortgage choice under the assumption that the resulting
contract reflects households’ preferences (Mian & Sufi 2011; Hall & Wood-
ward 2012; Fuster & Vickery 2013; Campbell & Cocco 2015; Foá et al. 2015;
Hurst et al. 2016). In doing that, we are the first to exploit data on product
offers from an online broker (the only source of information on the mortgage
loan-to-value currently available in Italy) as to account for variability in the
equilibrium mortgage price associated with the loan-to-value. This paper re-
lates to the literature on price dispersion too. Among other papers, Allen et al.
(2019) develop a search and negotiation model to quantify the role of search
costs and brand loyalty for market power; Allen et al. (2014a) show that price
dispersion in the credit market reflects consumer bargaining leverage; while
Allen et al. (2014b) relies on reduced-form techniques to argue that mergers
reduce price dispersion in the Canadian mortgage market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes some
stylized facts of the italian mortgage market. Section 2.3 outlines the model.
Section 2.4 describes the solution method and illustrates the parameterization.
Section 2.5 presents the results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Italian Mortgage Market
Mortgages represent the main source of liability of Italian households, account-
ing for over 50 per cent of their financial debt. They are almost entirely granted
by banks, for a total amount of about 385 billion euros in 2018, while other
financial intermediaries tend not to participate to this market at all. Default
on mortgage contracts are not very common in Italy. Following the financial
and sovereign debt crises, the share of new mortgages granted to borrowers at
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higher risk of default decreased significantly, reflecting both demand and sup-
ply factors. On one side, banks selectivity in granting mortgages increased; on
the other, demand from high-income households broadened. Based on latest
available data from the Center of Risks in Financial Intermediation (CRIF),
the share of risky borrowers is equal to 3 per cent, about 8 percentage points
less than in 2012. The mean loan-to-value (LTV) is around 65 per cent ac-
cording to the Regional Banking Lending Survey (RBLS), slightly higher than
the average value (less than 60 per cent) recorded in the period 2012-16. New
loans with LTV above 80 per cent account for less than 10 per cent of the total;
these loans are penalized by regulation as banks must detain extra capital in
order to grant them. Average mortgage length is 22 years and around 20 per
cent of new loans have duration above 30 years. Adjustable-rate mortgages
(ARM) account for the majority of outstanding loans (around 60 per cent),
although they are less common now than in the past. The share of new fixed-
rate mortgages (FRM) has significantly increased in recent years, also thanks
to the low-rate environment, and has reached about 70 per cent in 2018 (25 per
cent in 2012). Other mortgage typologies (mixed-rate mortgages, adjustable
rate mortgages with a cap, mortgages allowing to reset the interest rate) are
very rare or unavailable. One notable fact about the Italian mortgage mar-
ket is that since 2008, with the so called Bersani Law, households are allowed
to modify their contract terms and, specifically, they can reduce their mort-
gage instalments without paying any additional extra costs. This lead to an
acceleration, particularly pronounced since 2015, in the recourse to mortgage
renegotiations, which reached 17 per cent of the new loans origination in 2018.
(Attinà & Michelangeli 2020).
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Model assumptions
We model households’ choice of financial intermediary upon taking a new mort-
gage to quantify the impact of brand name on consumers’ search costs. We
restrict the analysis to indebted households with an already established re-
lationship with a lender, and we exclude first-time borrowers. The former
are the ones facing the highest costs of switching to a new intermediary, and
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are naturally more inclined to accept higher mortgage rates. When taking a
mortgage (which could be a refinancing of a previous loan, as well as a new
loan for house purchase), the household can either remain with the current
lender, or put effort to find a cheaper one. This effort choice entails some
initial search costs and affects the household’s life-time savings accumulation
and consumption levels.
The timing of the events is as follows. The household enters at period t =
40, observing her cash-on-hand and her current period financial intermediary,
and makes her effort choice. In the initial period, she can decide to take
a new mortgage from her current financial intermediary, or to exert positive
effort in looking for a new one that offers a cheaper price. In all the subsequent
periods, for the entire duration of the mortgage, the household pays a mortgage
instalment that depends on her initial choice of the financial intermediary. In
each period, the household also chooses consumption Ct and the fraction of the
remaining cash-on-hand to invest in the risky asset αt. After those decisions
are made, shocks to risky assets’ return, labor income and survival probability
are realized, and next period wealth is determined.
In the baseline model, we assume that the house value is fixed at 200.000
euro, the LTV equals 60%, the maturity is 20 years (which capture the median
values in Italy), and the mortgage rate type is fixed (around 80% of new Italian
mortgages are fixed-rate).
Household’s Preferences. Let Sit = {Xit, Hit−1} denote the household
vector of state variables, where t = 40, ..., T is household’s age and T is set to
100; Xit = Wit + Yit is cash-on-hand, which includes wealth at the beginning
of period t and labor income; Hit is the household’s financial intermediary.
Households’ preferences are described by a standard CRRA utility function in





where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In the final period, the
household consumes all her wealth and does not receive any utility from leaving
a bequest to her heirs.
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Household’s Income. We follow the labor income process in Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (2005). Before retirement, household i’s labor income, Yit, is
exogenously given by:
log(Yit) = f(t) + vit + εit (2.2)
where t indexes the household’s age, f(t) is a deterministic function of age, εit
is an idiosyncratic temporary shock distributed as N(0, σ2ε ), and vit is given
by:
vit = vit−1 + uit (2.3)
where uit is distributed as N(0, σ2u) and it is uncorrelated with εit. Hence,
log labor income is the sum of a deterministic component, which is calibrated
to replicate hump-shaped earnings over the lifecycle, and two random com-
ponents, one transitory and one persistent. Retirement income is a constant
fraction of permanent labor income in the last working-year.
Financial assets. There are two financial assets. The first one is a riskless
asset with gross real return RF = 1+ rF . The second one is a risky asset with
gross real return Rt = 1+ rt. As in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005), the
excess premium, namely the difference between the gross real return on the
risky asset and the gross real return on the safe asset, is:
Rt+1 −RF = µr + ιt+1 (2.4)
where µr is the mean excess premium and ιt+1 is the innovation to the excess
premium distributed as N(0, σ2ι ). Bt and St denote the amount of safe and
risky assets held by the household at time t, such that:
St ≥ 0, Bt ≥ 0, ∀t. (2.5)
Equation 2.5 implies that the household cannot short-sell any of these assets.
2.3.2 The Household’s Optimization Problem
In the first period, the household takes the effort choice decision. If she exerts
positive effort (e > 0), the Bellman equation is:
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V (Sit, e > 0) = max
Cit,αit
U(Cit) + βsp(it+ 1)EtV (Sit+1) (2.6)
where next period wealth is given by:
Wit+1 = Rt+1(Wit + Yit − Cit −M(Hit)−Q) (2.7)
M(Hit) is the mortgage instalment that depends on the financial intermediary,
which here is the one offering the lowest price; Q reflects the search costs that
are paid only in the initial period, including those to get information on the
lender; β is the discount factor; and sp(it+ 1) the survival probability at age
t. If she exerts zero effort (e = 0), she remains with the previous financial in-
termediary, the search costs are equal to zero and the Bellman equation boils
down to:
V (Sit, e = 0) = max
Cit,αit
U(Cit) + βsp(it+ 1)EtV (Sit+1) (2.8)
where next period wealth is given by:
Wit+1 = Rt+1(Wit + Yit − Cit −M(Hit)) (2.9)
Moreover, the following conditions always hold:
Cit ≥ Cmin, 0 ≤ αit ≤ 1 (2.10)
meaning that household’s consumption must be positive and above a minimum
level, and the share invested in risky assets must be in between 0 and 1. In
the initial period, the households chooses the effort level that delivers the
maximum between V (Sit, e > 0) and V (Sit, e = 0). In the following periods
until maturity, the household chooses consumption and the share of portfolio
to invest in the risky asset, subject to uncertainty over survival, income and
returns on financial assets.
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2.4 Solution Method
The model is solved using numerical techniques (Judd 1998). Specifically, we
rely on value function iterations starting from the final life period and mov-
ing backward until age 40. In the last period, a terminal value function is
obtained for each combination of the state variables. That function acts as
a continuation value function. In each previous period and for each vector
of state variable, the household chooses her consumption and share of risky
assets. As consumption and portfolio choices are continuous variables, we use
cubic spline interpolation to evaluate the function outside the grid. Mortgage
instalments are fixed for the mortgage duration and depend on the price rank-
ing of the bank. In the initial period, the household makes a discrete choice
over effort: she can exert positive effort and choose the financial intermediary
that offers the lowest price, or she can exert zero effort and remain with the
current financial intermediary. This effort decision depends on the maximum
value of the value function associated with each grid point of the vector of
state variables in the initial period. We implement grid search to select over
the possible choices and rely on the quadrature based method (Tauchen &
Hussey 1991) to approximate the return on risky assets. We also include a
small probability for the event risk. Once the model is solved and the policy
functions are obtained, we simulate 3,000 households of age 40 and we use the
computed policy functions to obtain households’ choices over time.
2.4.1 Parameterization
We draw from several data sources to select parameter values used in the model
(see Table 2.1). We use the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
from the Bank of Italy for mortgage characteristics and income;6 ISTAT for sur-
vival probabilities and minimum consumption;7 OECD for replacement rates
and for computing equivalent consumption; Mediobanca for return on risky
assets;8 Credit Register and MutuiOnline (CR-MO) data for mortgage rate




9CR-MO is obtained from CR data merged with MO data. Access to CR and MO databases
is described in chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.
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ers and restrict the sample to individuals older than 40 years as to capture
indebted households looking for a new mortgage. As mortgage choices and
subsequent payment of the instalments typically occur during the household’s
working age, we abstract from considerations about retirement medical costs,
moving costs, and bequest preferences. The final SHIW sample consists of
about 2,500 households, which we combine with the matched CR-MO dataset
to compare empirical evidences with our model predictions.
Preference and demographic parameters. Following standard values in
the literature of portfolio choice, we fix the risk aversion parameter γ to 5
and the discount factor to 0.96. The bequest parameter θ is set to zero, and
households are assumed to consume all their wealth before dying. Survival
probabilities are based on ISTAT data and refer to the average values for the
Italian population in each year.
Income. We use SHIW data to estimate Equation 2.2, according to which
household labor income is given by a function of age and income shocks. Labor
income includes working income, workers compensation and transfers, but not
capital income. We carry our estimation on the sample of indebted households
aged 40 to 65, without distinguishing them based on their education level or
marital status. This because around 80% of households in our sample have
high school degree and are married, thus if we were to split by education
or marital status the estimation would count on a very limited number of
observations. We estimate the parameters for the variance of the persistent
and the transitory shock using the approach described in Blundell et al. (2008).
Households retire at age 65. The replacement rate is taken from OECD data
and equals 91.8%.10
Financial markets. We define as safe assets the sum of deposits and short-
term government bonds, and as risky assets other bonds, stocks, managed
assets, foreign bonds, and residual assets. For the return on the risky assets,
we use Mediobanca data since 1950. We compute the real stock return starting
from the index of total stock return deflated by the consumer price index, while
the return on safe assets is computed using the nominal return on Italian
10This implies that after retirement households receive a constant annual income equal to
91.8% of their income in the last working period.
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one-period bonds (BOT) deflated by the consumer price index to obtain real
returns. The excess premium is given by the difference between the real return
on risky assets and the real return on safe assets in each period. The mean
return on safe assets is rF = 0.012, the mean excess premium µ is 0.049, and
the standard deviation of the innovation to excess premium σι is 0.26. We
define as event risk a rare event that has a low probability of happening, but
to which is associated a significant reduction in the return of risky assets. We
assume that when the event risk occurs, the stock return equals its mean minus
two-standard-deviation, which corresponds to a stock return lower than -40%.
To assess the validity of this assumption, we consider two datasets covering the
years between 1950 and 2010: “Indice Annuale dei corsi della Borsa Italiana"
by Mediobanca, and the “Milan Comit Global - DS Total Return Inde" (DSRI).
The probability of an event risk is assumed to be equal to 0.05.
Consumption floor. According to ISTAT data, the level of absolute poverty
varies according to both the number of household’s components and the ge-
ographic area. Among households aged 18 to 59, it ranges from a minimum
of about 600 euro per month for a single household living in the South, and
a maximum of about 1,150 euro per month for a married couple living in the
North.11. To capture this heterogeneity, we assume a minimum consumption
floor Cmin of about 850 euro per month
Financial intermediaries and price of mortgages. We focus on charac-
teristics of the average mortgage in Italy. Based on SHIW data, the average
LTV is 60% and the average mortgage amount is 120,000 euro (which implies
a house value of 200,000 euro). We consider three types of financial interme-
diaries classified according to their price ranking: Low, Medium and High, to
which the model imputes their respective offered mortgage rate as taken from
the CR-MO dataset. We consider the average rate for fixed-term contracts
with LTV less than or equal to 60% and 20 years maturity, which reflects a
safe profile. Within this bin (or combination of LTV, maturity and rate-type),
we observe some degree of price dispersion: the low rate equals 1.87%, the
middle rate equals 2.03%, the high rate equals 2.37%. We exploit the French
amortization formula, quite standard in Italy, to compute the mortgage instal-
ments associated to each of the three types of lender over the duration of the
11Data from “La misura della povertá assoluta," ISTAT 2018, adjusted for inflation.
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mortgage. Households are not allowed to change bank after the first period,
which is a reasonable assumption to make as we are not considering changes
in the interest rates at the macro level. Households at age 40 have all the
necessary information to make a choice that would affect their future lifetime.
2.5 Model results
We evaluate predictions of our model against real data, and we quantify the
search costs paid by the households before and after the rebranding event.
The main statistics for the Italian economy are reported in Table 2.2. As
initial condition, we assign households to three types of financial intermedi-
aries (High, Medium or Low offered price) according to their pre-rebranding
distribution from the CR-MO dataset: almost 33% of households have a low-
price lender, 45% of them have a medium-price one, and the remaining 22%
have a high-price one. For statistics on labor income, annual consumption and
portfolio choices we rely on SHIW data. The model is able to deliver median
values for annual income and annual consumption that closely mirror those
observed in the real data: annual labor income is just above 30 thousand euro,
annual consumption is around 28 thousand euro. To mirror true data on the
share of households with risky assets, we account for tail risks in their return.
This makes risk-averse households less inclined to take on risky investments
and delivers a share of around 20 percent, in line with the one observed in the
data. A model without tail risks would convey a much higher share because
the average return on the risky asset exceeds the one on the safe asset.
We use the model to predict our two main variables of interest: the degree
of dispersion in the price of homogeneous mortgage contracts (measured as
the standard deviation in the mortgage rates) and the search costs faced by
the household when choosing a financial intermediary. We exploit borrowers’
transition matrices across lenders derived from our combined CR-MO dataset,
which reflect the household’s probability to either remain with her time t = 0
lender, or to move to a better one at time t = 1. One obvious difficulty is
to identify better and worse lenders. In fact, some households might value
more non-financial conditions (such as speediness) than financial ones; while
some others might be rationed by all banks but the chosen one. In this paper,
we abstract from reasons that could induce households to move to a more
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expensive intermediary, and we assume that less expensive products are, all
else equal, better products from a rational consumer in an economy without
frictions. Hence, households with a low-price intermediary never switch.12
Our model delivers a standard deviation of 23 bps, which is consistent with
the value observed in the data before any rebranding event occurs (24 bps).
Table 2.3 presents our main results.
We consider two different scenarios. The first one (“no rebranding”) cap-
tures what happens in untreated provinces, under the assumption that they
are comparable with treated ones before the rebranding.13 To calibrate search
costs, we let households reallocate according to the transition matrices ob-
served in treated provinces before the event: about 50% of them does not
move; while almost 17% switches to a low-price lender. The initial amount of
search cost consistent with this reallocation is 1080 euro (0.9% of the average
loan amount), similar to the estimates provided by Bhutta et al. 2018 for the
US.14 Price dispersion decreases to 19 bps. The second scenario (“rebranding”)
captures what happens in provinces affected by the shift in brand popularity,
where households reallocate from one intermediary to the other according to
the transition matrices observed in treated provinces after the event. Price
dispersion decreases from 23 bps (initial value at time t = 0) to 18 bps (post-
treatment value at time t = 1). Both values very much replicate the ones
observed in the data (price dispersion in treated provinces is about 24 bps
before the rebranding, and 19 bps after). The share of households that do
not move shrinks to 40%, and the share of those moving to a cheaper lender
exceeds 25%. The search cost consistent with this reallocation drops by 30 per
cent, to 750 euro, which conforms to previous findings by Allen et al. (2019).15
By comparing the above two scenarios, we can also quantify the treatment
effect in consumers’ search costs and price dispersion due to the rebranding.
According to the model, branding leads to a 330 euro decrease in search costs
paid by the household at the beginning of the period. This accounts for poten-
tial transportation costs to visit a branch, other financial outlays sustained to
get information on a new lender (for example, phone calls or interned), non-
12This is not a very strong assumption: according to CR-MO data, only a minor share of
households move to a lender offering a higher price than their current one.
13This is the closest possible to a parallel trend assumption and allows for homogeneity
within our model.
14They estimate upfront costs for the borrower attributable to shopping or knowledge equal
to about 1.2% of an average loan.
15They find that 50% of search frictions are specifically due to search costs.
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monetary costs (search effort, time devoted to shopping around, inconvenience
experienced to avail a product, and psychology costs like the fear of rejection),
while it does not include savings accrued from lower monthly payments also
attained when shifting to a cheaper lender. Counting them in would lead to a
total benefit for the household of 6% of the initial loan amount, correspond-
ing to more than 7200 euro.16 Moreover, the standard deviation in the APR
goes down both in treated and untreated provinces, but the decrease is more
pronounced (precisely by 1%) in treated ones, consistently with our previous
empirical findings on the treatment effect of brand name on price dispersion.
As a corollary of our model, we show that households choosing low-price
intermediaries have, on average, higher income (in line with what emerges from
the the SHIW). Among households that switch to a lower price-ranking lender,
we record a 9% reduction in the share of those investing in risky assets. This
happens because households are risk-averse, and prefer to attain their target
level of consumption by limiting tail-risk exposure, which implies a reduction
in investor’s riskiness at the aggregate level.
2.6 Conclusion
We derive a life-cycle model that accounts for households’ choice of financial
intermediary. Our model is well calibrated on Italian data and quantifies a
decline in consumers’ search costs following the rebranding equal to 330 euro,
which does not contradict previous results. Adding in the savings from lower
mortgage instalments for borrowers that move to cheaper lenders, whose share
after the rebranding increases by roughly 10 per cent, the total gain for the
household amounts to 6 per cent of the average Italian loan. Also, the re-
branding event affects households’ portfolio choice by limiting risk exposure
in the financial market. We conclude that brand awareness brings new clients
to lenders that are more price competitive, and reduces the extent to which
borrowers overpay relative to the rates available on the market.
16Estimates are obtained considering moving from a High to a Low price, i.e. from 2.36%
to 1.87%, for a 20 year maturity mortgage with 60% LTV and 200,000 house value, in line
with empirical evidence from the SHIW.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Parameterization
Description Parameter value Source
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 5 Gomes & Michaelides (2005)
Discount factor β 0.98 Campbell & Cocco (2015)
Bequest factor θ 0 Cocco et al. (2005)
Retirement age K 65 Cocco et al. (2005)




Variance permanent labor income shock σe 0.0166 SHIW
Variance transitory labor income shock σu 0.0220 SHIW
Replacement rate (%) 91.8 OCSE
Return on risk free asset rf 1.012 Mediobanca
Excess return µ 0.049 Mediobanca
Std. dev. return on risky assets σr 0.0784 Mediobanca
Tail risk - 2 σr Mediobanca
Pr(tail risk) 0.05 Mediobanca
Rate on consumer credit r 1.08 ECB
House value (median, euro) 200,000 SHIW
LTV (median, %) 60 SHIW
Mortgage maturity (median, years) 20 SHIW
Mortgage rate (%) Low 1.87 CR-MO
Mortgage rate (%) Medium 2.03 CR-MO
Mortgage rate (%) High 2.37 CR-MO
Note: The table reports the parameter values assumed in the model and their source.
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Table 2.2: Main statistics for the economy
Data Model Data Source
Initial conditions:
Share of HHs by type of lender (%)
Low price 32.4 32.4 CR-MO
Medium price 45.1 45.1 CR-MO
High price 22.4 22.4 CR-MO
Price dispersion (%) 0.24 0.23 CR-MO
Labor income (median, thousands euro) 31.9 30.1 SHIW
Annual consumption (median, thousands euro) 27.6 28.2 SHIW
Share of HHs with risky assets (%) 18.4 18.7 SHIW
Note: The SHIW sample consists of indebted households in their working period (40-65
years old). SHIW data include the 2002-2016 waves.
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Table 2.3: Model results
Data Model Data Source
No rebranding (untreated provinces)
Transition matrixes
- HHs that remain with previous lender (%) 49.6 50.9 CR-MO
- HHs that move to cheaper lender (%) 16.0 16.7 CR-MO
Search costs (euro) 1080
Price dispersion (%) 0.19
Rebranding (treated provinces)
Transition matrixes
- HHs that remain with previous lender (%) 40.4 39.7 CR-MO
- HHs that move to cheaper lender (%) 25.4 27.8 CR-MO
Search costs (euro) 750
Price dispersion (%) 0.18
Delta (Rebranding − No rebranding)
Search costs (euro) 330
Price Dispersion (%) -0.01 -0.01 CR-MO
Note: The Table reports the model results for transition matrices, price dispersion and
search costs. The last two rows (Delta) capture the treatment effect of rebranding, that is the
differences in price dispersion and search costs between the “no-rebranding" and “rebranding"
scenario.
3. What can we learn about mortgage
supply from online data?
3.1 Introduction
Over the past years, a new type of information brought about by digitalization,
the so-called Big Data,1 has become available in large amount to support pol-
icymaking (Edelman 2012; Einav & Levin 2013). A key advantage of datasets
obtained from digital sources, as compared to traditional ones, is that they are
often very timely and very granular. This makes them extremely useful for
up-to-date assessments of the impact of economic policies.
We exploit data on mortgage supply from the major online broker in Italy,
MutuiOnline, to analyse the evolution of mortgage supply by risk-profile.2
From a financial stability perspective, this allows to monitor banks’ risk tak-
ing behaviour over time, and to evaluate changes in their incentive to engage
in risky lending following the implementation of regulatory policies. It also
uncovers systematic differences between the supply policy of online versus tra-
ditional banks. Furthermore, we present the first application of online data
to nowcast mortgage rates. By relying on both standard regression analysis
and machine learning algorithms, we asses the extent to which online prices
improve short-term prediction of the realized interest rate. The nowcasting
exercise is particularly informative for monetary policy. It provides policy-
makers with an estimate of the actual rate months before before this becomes
available, thus allowing for a timelier assessment of the transmission of changes
in policy rates to lending supply conditions. Previous papers have used infor-
mation from web to nowcast, and forecast at longer horizons, other economic
indicators, including unemployment (Fondeur & Karamé 2013; Vicente et al.
1The term Big Data refers to “the massive volume of data generated by the increasing use
of digital tools and information systems” (FSB, 2017; Tissot 2017). They are “unstruc-
tured data resulting from non-statistical activity or structured data that create operational
challenges owing to their size or complexity” (Cœuré 2017; Nymand-Andersen 2015).
2Data have been provided free of charge by MutuiOnline.it for research purposes at the Bank
of Italy. They refer to fictitious customer profiles and contain no personal confidential in-
formation. Use of privately own data for research purposes does not imply the endorsement
of the owner, its products or services.
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2015; D’Amuri & Marcucci 2017), housing demand (Pangallo & Loberto 2018)
and local economic activity (Glaeser et al. 2017).
Our database covers over 30 lenders (including the largest banks in the
country) and about 85,000 borrower profiles. The 85,000 profiles are fixed
over time and adjustments in the offer rates entirely reflect the bank’s lending
choice. Differently from studies based on the equilibrium rate, our analysis
is immune from demand side biases and the associated endogeneity problems
arising either from borrowers’ self-selection into specific banks, or from dis-
couraged borrowers that choose not to apply (Michelangeli & Sette 2016).
In fact, by holding the demand constant, we can fully isolate changes in the
supply. Moreover, compared to traditional statistics accessible for the Ital-
ian mortgage market, MutuiOnline data (MO) are more attractive in terms
of both granularity and frequency of the information provided: they represent
the only source of information on the mortgage loan-to-value (LTV) currently
available in Italy, and they are available about 50 days before the release of offi-
cial bank-level interest rate statistics (MIR).3 Data are collected on a monthly
basis within the 10th day of each reference month, in line with the timing of
mortgage pricing decisions (typically taken at the beginning of each month).
Our main results are the following. First, risky profiles (characterized by
higher LTV, longer maturity and lower borrower’s income) face both systemat-
ically higher offer rates and fewer contract offers compared to other, less risky,
profiles. This could mean that banks’ actually price risk correctly. By com-
parison, online banks charge lower prices and serve a larger share of profiles
than traditional ones. Second, online data are powerful in nowcasting official
fixed mortgage rates contracts (the currently most used contract in Italy), also
controlling for time-varying demand conditions (lagged values of the consumer
confidence index), the market reference rate (10-year interest rate swap, IRS),
and unobserved time-invariant bank characteristics. Using a machine learning
algorithm we show that the main predictor for the delta in the realized fixed
rate is the contemporaneous change in the online offer rate attached to a low-
risk profile. This suggests that fixed-rate mortgages are typically chosen by
safer borrowers and, more broadly, that online mortgage data are important
for a prompt assessment of changes in household financing conditions.
3MFI Interest Rate (MIR) are euro area harmonized statistics.
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Related Literature This paper relates to the growing body of research
that uses unconventional data to back traditional statistics and get a better
understanding of economic phenomena (Granello & Wheaton 2004; Ettredge
& Karuga 2005; Cavallo 2017; Basten et al. 2018; Bhutta et al. 2018; Fuster
et al. 2018; Glaeser et al. 2018; Gorodnichenko et al. 2018; Hertzberg et al.
2018; Bartlett et al. 2019; Basten et al. 2019). In particular, our analysis
builds on the recent literature that uses machine learning techniques to pre-
dict consumers’ default (Fuster et al. 2018; Albanesi 2019) and to forecast
bankruptcy (Barboza2017; Moscatelli et al. 2019. Among the machine learn-
ing approaches, we rely on the random forest algorithm (Breiman 2001), only
recently applied in economic contexts for forecasting (Glaeser et al. 2017) and
variable selection (De Moor, Lieven and Luitel, Prabesh and Sercu, Piet and
Vanpée, Rosanne 2018). The random forest algorithm has a high predictive
performance, generally outperforms other traditional approaches, and delivers
a ranking of the indicators used to predict the target variable that allows for
identification of the most relevant one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data.
Section 3.3 presents descriptive statistics and provides empirical evidence on
the evolution of mortgage supply conditions by borrowers’ risk-profile. Sec-
tion 3.4 highlights the main differences between online and traditional banks.
Section 3.5 illustrates the nowcasting exercise. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Data
Mutuionline (MO) is an online mortgage broker that lists mortgage rates
offered by affiliated banks, including all the major Italian banks, and puts
prospective borrowers in touch with the bank making the preferred offer.4
Upon submitting an application through MO, borrowers have to specify sev-
eral characteristics, which the broker then uses to identify the applicant risk-
profile, the list of banks willing to make an offer, and the terms of the contracts
offered (e.g., net interest rate, additional fees, monthly instalments).
Figure C.1 illustrates a screenshot of the main characteristics that the
borrower has to specify in order to submit the online application (age, job
4In 2015 MutuiOnline intermediated about 2.5 billion euro of mortgages, which corresponds
to about 6 per cent of the total amount of new loans for home purchase in Italy. Since
then, this share has been on the rise.
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type, income, mortgage type, rate type, house value, mortgage amount, and
house location). A profile is a combination of these characteristics. Once the
borrower provides this information, the broker lists the sample of banks willing
to grant her a loan and the financial conditions they apply (Figure C.2). This
represents the pre-approval stage of the application process. Our data allow us
to observe up to this point, with no information on subsequent stages leading
to actual conclusion of the contract.
We observe mortgage offers by banks for roughly 85,000 prospective bor-
rower profiles, each one defined by a combination of: mortgage category (first
home vs subrogation), rate type (fixed vs adjustable), loan-to-value (LTV),
maturity, applicant’s age, income, job type, and location. The number and
terms of contracts offered vary across profiles and over time, depending on
banks’ willingness to grant a loan through the broker. The contract terms of-
fered are binding, conditional on the accuracy of the information provided by
the applicant. We consider applications for first house purchase and for rene-
gotiations of the contract terms only. House value is fixed at 200,000 euro and
mortgage amount varies with the LTV. In the next stage (which we don’t ob-
serve), the household selects the preferred offer and provides the broker with
additional personal information (full name, date and municipality of birth,
current address of residence, marital status, tax identification number, job po-
sition, etc.). The broker forwards this information to the bank, which then
reaches out the borrower. Finalization of the contract occurs at the bank’s
branch, or online if the bank does not have any. At this point, the offer rate
cannot be modified, unless information provided by the household turns out to
be incorrect. Banks active on the platform have a commitment to the broker
not to modify the terms of the contract posted online and, for reputational
concerns, they have very low incentive not to respect such a commitment. Ac-
cording to MO reports, mortgage applications and mortgages actually settled
exhibit strong similarities (Figure C.4 Appendix C).
Data are collected on a monthly basis, from March 2018 to August 2019,
and within the 10th day of each reference month.5 The sample of institutions
working with MO consists of all the major Italian banking groups and other
leading mortgage lenders in the country, accounting for more than 80 percent
of residential mortgages granted in 2018. Our data include information on
the characteristics of the borrower and the contract, as well as the contract
5Mortgage pricing decisions are mostly taken by banks at the beginning of the month.
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terms offered (Table 3.1). By comparison, official interest rate statistics (MIR)
are available about 50 days later than MO data and are aggregated at the
bank level, thus not providing any information on the characteristics of the
borrower or the contract.6 Other traditional data sources, such as the Interest
Rate Reporting (TAXIA) and the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), are available
only quarterly and also do not include variables (such as the mortgage loan-
to-value and maturity, and the borrowers’ income) that account for most of
the variation in the transacted rates.
We construct a matrix where, for each of the 85,000 profiles, we record the
conditions offered (if any) by each bank in each month (Figure C.3). Among
contract terms, we mostly focus on interest rates, always distinguishing be-
tween fixed and adjustable rates. For a given profile, we also report informa-
tion on the share of banks that offer a product. The complement to 1 of this
indicator (the “no offer rate”) is correlated with the probability that a bank
denies credit to a given profile and, thus, is informative on the actual loan
rejection rate.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for the month-to-month change in the
mortgage rate offered through MutuiOnline. We analyse fixed (FRM) and
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) separately, to account for the possibility
that intermediaries specialize in one of the two mortgage type, associated
with specific risk levels. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution over time (aver-
age, median, 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentiles) of mortgage rates offered
by banks through MO, distinguishing between fixed and adjustable. Fixed
rates are generally higher than adjustable, with some heterogeneity across
banks and profiles. We further breakdown mortgage rates by borrower and
contract characteristics, as to evaluate heterogeneity in pricing due to differ-
ent risk profiles. Such a breakdown would not be possible with alternative
6MIR statistics include information on interest rates applied by monetary financial institu-
tions in the euro area to loans and deposits vis- á-vis households and non-financial corpora-
tions. The financial institutions involved in the data collection are legally obliged to report
monthly information to their National Central Banks, which in turn report to the ECB.
Data are collected on a sample basis; in Italy the sample consists of banks representing
about 85 per cent of total outstanding loans and deposits to households and firms. MIR
data can be downloaded here.
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traditional databases, for they lack several pricing-relevant information (such
as the mortgage LTV and maturity and the borrower’s income). Figure 3.2
plots the evolution of fixed and adjustable interest rates by mortgage LTV
and maturity, and by borrower’s income and job type. Additional summary
statistics are reported in Table C.1 of Appendix C. Riskier contracts, namely
those with high LTV (above 80 per cent), long maturity (30 years), or fixed
rate, are associated with higher average interest rates and greater dispersion.
As for borrower characteristics (income level and job type), rates exhibit lit-
tle variation.7 Geographic characteristics of the province where the property
is located do not explain variation in mortgage prices, possibly reflecting the
fact that local differences in house prices, employment and economic growth
are captured by other product characteristics (notably the LTV). The no-offer
rate shows variability across both borrower and contract characteristics too
(see Table C.2 in Appendix C). In particular, riskier contracts have a higher
probability of not being offered: for instance, the probability of not facing an
offer exceeds 80 per cent for borrowers without a permanent job and is above
90 per cent for loans with LTV greater than 80 per cent.
We also look at the distribution of interest rates for different banks’ cat-
egories: the largest five banking groups, other significant groups (subsidiaries
of foreign banking groups included), less significant groups, and online banks
(Figure 3.3). Overall, there is significant heterogeneity across banks’ category
(see also Tables C.3, C.4 and Figure C.5 in Appendix C for more detail and a
comparison of the mean across groups). For fixed-rate mortgages, the top five
largest groups offer the most expensive rates and exhibit the highest degree of
dispersion; for adjustable-rate mortgages, subsidiaries banks offer the highest
rates and features the largest dispersion.
Next, we define two profiles characterized by different risk levels:8
1. Low-risk profile: mortgage LTV equal to 60 per cent and mortgage matu-
rity equal to 15 years; borrower with a permanent employment contract
and net monthly income equal to 4000 euro;
2. High-risk profile: mortgage LTV equal to 80 per cent and mortgage ma-
turity equal to 20 years; borrower with a permanent employment contract
7Differences in interest rates by borrower characteristics are statistically significant.
8We do not present results for the very risk profile (LTV above 80 per cent and fixed-term
job) because very few banks are willing to accept these applications and, therefore, results
are very sensitive to changes made by just one lender.
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and net monthly income equal to 2000 euro.
For both profiles, the age is fixed at 30 years, all mortgages are for first house
purchase and we distinguish between fixed and adjustable rates. We analyse
each profile with respect to four indicators: rate level, month-to-month change
and volatility (standard deviation), and no-offer rate. Figure 3.4 shows that
the average interest rate associated with the high-risk profile is significantly
higher than the one associated with the low risk profile. The difference is, on
average, equal to 20 basis points and it is higher for FRM (25 b.p. versus 14
b.p. for ARM). Differences have become more pronounced over time, reaching
36 b.p. for FRM and 18 b.p. for ARM in August 2019. For both profiles, rates
have decreased over the past years, with the reduction being more marked for
the low-risk profile. As for the month-to-month change, fixed rates have been
on a decreasing trend lately, while adjustable-rate mortgages have been more
stable. The only exception was October 2018, when rates increased for fixed-
rate mortgages and decreased for adjustable ones. The standard deviation is
quite high for all profiles and mortgage types, and averaged to about 30 basis
points (or 20 per cent of the average mortgage rate). The average no-offer rate
is below 10 per cent for the low risk profile. After increasing slightly in January
2019, the rate decreased and flattened at around 0 per cent since April 2019,
meaning that all banks in the sample were willing to offer a mortgage to safe
borrowers. This is not true for the high risk profile: the no-offer rate is on
average equal to 20 per cent, although it has also been declining since January
2019.
3.4 Online versus traditional banks
Our dataset allows to disentangle differences in mortgage policies adopted by
online banks from those chosen by traditional brick-and-mortar banks. This
provides preliminary insights on the impact of digital technology and the ben-
efits for final consumers stemming from Fintech. Figure 3.5 shows that on-
line banks always offer lower average mortgage rates and are characterized
by lower no-offer rates, for both fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgages. The
difference between the interest rate offered by traditional and online banks
is larger for fixed-rate than for adjustable-rate mortgages. Specifically, be-
tween March 2018 and August 2019, the average offer rate was about 17 and
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9 p.p. lower, respectively for fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages, for on-
line banks compared to traditional ones. Online banks also exhibit a lower
dispersion, on average equal to 0.36 p.p. for fixed-rate mortgage and 0.22 p.p.
for adjustable-rate mortgages (it is 0.65 and 0.51 p.p. for traditional banks).
This could mean that lower costs sustained by online banks in the provision
of financial services, thanks to their use of advanced technologies, are at least
to some extent passed-through to customers in terms of lower rates. It could
also reflect superior skills of online banks in risk pricing.9 Differences between
online and traditional banks are confirmed also conditional on the riskiness of
the borrowers: online banks offer the lowest possible price for given segments
of clients based on their riskiness (in some cases the rate could be equal to
that offered by traditional banks, Figure 3.6). Finally, we check for differ-
ences between online and traditional banks that belong to the same banking
group. In our sample, we have four banking groups that include both online
and traditional banks. For these, on average over the entire period, online
banks charge lower rates than traditional banks belonging the same banking
group. However, there is some heterogeneity within risk profile, over time,
and across banks (Table 3.3). This implies that the banking group changes
its mortgage policy across the different channels (online vs traditional) every
month, allowing also for changes across profiles. A closer look indicates that,
for those profiles for which there is an offer from both traditional and online
banks, the interest rate is quite similar within the banking group.10
3.5 Nowcasting exercise
We use standard a regression analysis and a random forest algorithm to test
whether MO data help predicting official loan rates, and to evaluate their
nowcasting power. The regression we estimate is the following:
∆FRMbt = β0 + β1∆IRS10t + β2∆IRS10t−1 + β3∆IRS10t−2 + β4∆IRS10t−3
+ β5∆MObt + β6∆MObt−1 + β7∆MObt−2 + β8∆MObt−3
+ β8Conficencebt−1 + β9Confidencebt−2 + εbt (3.1)
9A more throughout assessment of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper and would
require additional analyses.
10There are several profiles for which we observe an offer only from the online banks; these
profiles mostly include first home mortgages, from applicants with a fixed term contract,
and characterized by low LTV.
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where b indexes the bank and t the month. IRS10 is the 10-year IRS, MO is
the average online offer rate from MutuiOnline, and Confidence is the consumer
confidence index from ISTAT.
We first regress the monthly change in the realized MIR fixed rate, at the bank
level, on the MO offered rate, averaged across all contracts offered by the bank in a
given month, and several other covariates (Table 3.4, Columns 1-3). The regression
with MO variables (Column 2) considerably improves the estimation and nowcasting
ability as compared to a specification including only the market reference rate (10-
year IRS; Column 1). The Adjusted R-squared increases to 31 percent (from 6
percent) and the share of correct out-of-sample predictions increases to 72 percent
(from 67).11 The coefficients on the MO rate remain unchanged upon inclusion
of monthly, time-varying, demand controls (the two lagged values of the consumer
confidence index), which also increases accuracy of the out-of-sample prediction (the
RMSE decreases and the share of correct predictions increases to 83 percent, Column
3).
Then, we run a random forest algorithm, which fully exploits the information
on all the borrower-contract profiles included in our dataset12 and further improves
predictive capacity: the out-of-sample RMSE decreases to 7.6 percent and the share
of correctly predicted cases increases to 89 percent (Column 4). Considering the
latest month in our sample (June 2019), the variable that plays the largest role
in driving the total variation is the contemporaneous change in the MO rate for
the profile with 80 percent LTV, 10-year maturity, age of 40, monthly net income
of 4,000 euro and permanent job (Figure 3.7, panel A). The second and the third
profiles in order of importance exhibit similar low-risk characteristics (60 percent
LTV, short maturity and permanent employment status), suggesting that FRM are
typically chosen by safe borrowers. The same analysis carried out for the previous
four months displays low time variability in the profiles ranking, suggesting that
banks only marginally adjust their pricing model over time (Figure 3.7, panel B).
Overall, the most important profiles are those with high LTV, short maturity, and
low-income volatility.
11This is calculated as the number of banks for which the predicted rate lies within one
standard deviation from the actual value on the last date of the sample (June 2019).
12We consider 128 profiles defined by combinations of LTV, maturity, age, income and job
type. Each profile captures a different risk-level.
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3.6 Conclusions
Online platforms provide researchers and policymakers with crowdsourced data at
the granular level, months before official statistics become available. This paper
describes data from the major online mortgage broker in Italy (MutuiOnline) and
shows how these can be exploited for policy analysis. Our dataset is extremely
valuable for it provides very timely information and accounts for different sources
of heterogeneity in the mortgage product (at both the borrower and contract level).
Traditional databases are available with some time lag and do not provide such
granular and detailed information on product characteristics. Also, they reflect an
equilibrium between demand and supply, which makes it hard to control for the
endogenous matching between banks, borrowers and contracts. Conversely, MO data
allow to fully isolate mortgage supply choices of the main Italian banks (conditional
on demand characteristics).
Our analysis indicates that, on average, riskier contracts are characterized by
higher mortgage rates and are generally offered by fewer intermediaries. Moreover,
online banks tend to charge lower rates than traditional ones. We also provide ev-
idence that online price data can improve short-term predictions and forecasting
models, allowing for a timelier appraisal of changes in banks’ lending strategies. In
particular, offer rates from MO contain policy-relevant information on realized banks’
rates (which also depend on loan demand conditions and unobserved time-invariant
bank characteristics). Such information can be extremely useful for nowcasting pur-
poses.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Borrower and contract characteristics
Characteristics of the borrower




Monthly net income 2000 or 4000 euro
Characteristics of the loan
Purpose of the contract First-time homebuyer,
renegotiations
Loan-to-value (LTV) 50, 60, 80 or 85 per cent
Rate type Fixed or adjustable
Maturity 10, 15, 20 or 30 years
Characteristics of the property
Location 110 Provinces
Characteristics of the offer
Monthly installment
Interest rate and APR
Contract name
Source: MutuiOnline.
CHAPTER 3. ONLINE MORTGAGE SUPPLY 81
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for the month-to-month change in the offer rate
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Fixed rate -0.03 0.02 -0.14 0.06
Adjustable rate -0,01 -0.02 -0.14 0.03
Note: Data are in percentage points The offer rate refers to the simple average across all
profiles of rates offered through Mutuionline. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Table 3.3: Within group rate differential between traditional and online banks
Panel A. Low risk profile
Fixed rate Variable rate
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Mar-18 0 0 -0.14 0.32 2.22 0.68 0 -0.2
Apr-18 0 0 0.04 0.35 2.27 0.63 0 -0.2
May-18 0 0 0.07 0.7 2.27 0.63 0 -0.2
Jun-18 0 0 0.02 0.66 2.27 0.63 0 -0.2
Jul-18 0 0 0.12 0.68 2.27 0.63 0 -0.2
Aug-18 0 0 0.48 0.74 2.27 0.63 0 0.05
Sep-18 0 0 0.45 0.8 2.27 0.63 0 0.05
Oct-18 0 0 0.48 -0.11 0 0 0 -0.1
Nov-18 0 0 0.36 -0.14 0 0 0 -0.1
Dec-18 0 0 0.38 -0.27 0 0 0 -0.1
Jan-19 0 0 1.57 0.1 0 0 0 1
Feb-19 0 0 0.1 -0.16 0 0 0 0.05
Mar-19 0 -0.01 0.25 -0.03 0 0 0 0.05
Apr-19 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0 0 0 0.05
May-19 0 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 0 0 0 0.05
Jun-19 0 -0.01 0.12 -0.17 0 0 0 0.06
Jul-19 0 -0.01 0.99 -0.06 0 0 0 0.1
Aug-19 0 -0.01 0.91 -0.25 0 0 0 0.79
Panel B. High risk profile
Fixed rate Variable rate
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Mar-18 0 0 0 -0.14 2.07 0.83 -0.2 0.1
Apr-18 0 0 0 0.16 2.07 0.83 -0.2 0.1
May-18 0 0 0 0.18 2.07 0.83 -0.2 0.1
Jun-18 0.23 0 0 0.13 2.07 0.83 -0.2 0.23
Jul-18 0.23 0 0 0.22 2.07 0.83 -0.2 0.23
Aug-18 0.22 0 0 0.55 2.07 0.83 0.05 0.22
Sep-18 0.22 0 0 0.54 2.07 0.83 0.05 0.22
Oct-18 -0.05 0 1.9 0.57 0 0 0 -0.05
Nov-18 -0.05 0 1.95 0.46 0 0 0 -0.05
Dec-18 -0.05 0 1.9 0.48 0 0 0 -0.05
Jan-19 0.05 0 0 1.72 0 0 1 0.05
Feb-19 0 0 0 -0.01 0 0 -0.11 -0.1
Mar-19 0 0 -0.01 0.16 0 0 -0.11 -0.1
Apr-19 0 0 -0.01 -0.12 0 0 -0.11 -0.1
May-19 0 0 -0.01 0.08 0 0 -0.11 -0.1
Jun-19 0 0 -0.01 0.03 0 0 -0.1 -0.1
Jul-19 0 0 -0.01 0.89 0 0 -0.06 -0.1
Aug-19 0 0 -0.01 2.16 0 0 0.68 -0.1
Note: Data are in percentage points are refer to average values for the period averages
March 2018 to August 2019. Low risk are profiles with mortgage LTV equal to 60 per
cent,mortgage maturity equal to 15 years and a permanent employment contract with net
monthly income equal to 4000 euro. High risk are profiles with mortgage LTV equal to 80
per cent, mortgage maturity equal to 20 years and a permanent employment contract with
net monthly income equal to 2000 euro. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Table 3.4: Predicting interest rates using OLS and machine learning: FRM
Monthly change in official fixed rate
Only reference rate + MutuiOnline average + demand controls Random Forest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Delta IRS-10y (t) 0.203*** 0.154 0.257***
(0.112) (0.095) (0.150)
L.Delta IRS-10y (t) 0.174 0.113 0.107
(0.110) (0.076) (0.074)
L2.Delta IRS-10y (t) -0.089 0.031 0.068
(0.114) (0.085) (0.087)
L3.Delta IRS-10y (t) 0.120 -0.141 0.023
(0.109) (0.098) (0.179)
MO delta rate (b, t) 0.394*** 0.388***
(0.073) (0.074)
L.MO delta rate (b, t) 0.107*** 0.112***
(0.045) (0.046)
L2.MO delta rate (b, t) 0.197*** 0.192***
(0.048) (0.046)






Bank FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 234 234 234 329
Adjusted R-squared 0.061 0.310 0.307
Out of sample RMSE 0,1106 0,1109 0,0974 0,0759
Out of sample correct predictions 0.67 0.72 0.83 0.89
Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the monthly change in official interest rate on fixed-rate
mortgage, at the bank level. MO delta rate is the monthly change in MO offered rate (net
of fees and commissions) on fixed-rate mortgages in the Mutuionline dataset; IRS-10y is
the 10-year interest rate swap in euro; consumer confidence is a measure of how optimistic
or pessimistic households are regarding their expected financial situation. Note: b stands
for banks and t for months. Ln is the n-months lag. Columns 1 to 3 show the results
from standard OLS regressions; Column 4 those from a random forest algorithm. Out-of-
sample correct predictions are those within one standard deviation from the true value, with
reference to the June 2019. All models specifications include bank fixed effects). Source:
Mutuionline, MIR, and ISTAT.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Online offer rates
(a) Fixed-rate mortgages (FRM) (b) Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM)
Note: Data are in percentage points. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Figure 3.2: Online offer rates by loan and borrower’s characteristics
(a) FRM by LTV (b) FRM by maturity
(c) FRM by income level (d) FRM by job type
(e) ARM by LTV (f) ARM by maturity
(g) ARM by income level (h) ARM by job type
Note: Data are in percentage points. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Figure 3.3: Online offer rates by bank category
(a) Top 5 institutions, FRM (b) Other significant institutions, FRM
(c) Less significant institutions, FRM (d) Online banks, FRM
(e) Top 5 institutions, ARM (f) Other significant institutions, ARM
(g) Less significant institutions, ARM (h) Online banks, ARM
Note: Data are in percentage points. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Figure 3.4: Online offer rates by risk profile
(a) Levels, FRM (b) Month-to-month change, FRM
(c) Standard deviation, FRM (d) No-offer rate, FRM
(e) Levels, ARM (f) Month-to-month change, ARM
(g) Standard deviation, ARM (h) No-offer rate, ARM
Note: Data are in percentage points. Source: MutuiOnline and authors’ elaborations.
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Figure 3.5: Traditional versus online banks
(a) Fixed-rate mortgage (b) No-offer rate, FRM
(c) Adjustable-rate mortgage (d) No-offer rate, ARM
Note: Data are in percentage points. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Figure 3.6: Traditional versus online banks by risk profile
(a) Low risk, FRM (b) High risk, FRM
(c) Low risk, ARM (d) High risk, ARM
Note: Data are in percentage points. Source: MutuiOnline and authors’ elaborations.
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Figure 3.7: Random Forest, fixed rate
Panel A: Profile importance, June 2019
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
LTV 60, maturity 10, age 40, income
4000, permanent job
LTV 60, maturity 20, age 30, income
2000, permanent job
LTV 80, maturity 10, age 40, income
4000, permanent job
Variable importance
Panel B: Profile importance over time
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
LTV 80, maturity 15, age 30, income
4000, permanent job
LTV 80, maturity 15, age 40, income
4000, permanent job




0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
LTV 60, maturity 20, age 40, income
2000, permanent job
LTV 80, maturity 15, age 40, income
4000, permanent job




0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
LTV 80, maturity 15, age 30, income
4000, permanent job
LTV 80, maturity 15, age 40, income
4000, permanent job




0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
LTV 60, maturity 20, age 40, income
2000, permanent job
LTV 80, maturity 15, age 40, income
4000, permanent job




Note: The importance score indicates how useful each indicator is in predicting the target
variable using the random forest. The score varies between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most
informative variable. Source: MutuiOnline, MIR and ISTAT.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 1
French Amortization
We use the French amortization method to estimate the original maturity of
the mortgage. This is the most diffused repayment plan among Italian banks,
characterized by fixed instalments comprised of interest payments (decreasing)
and principal amounts (increasing). For each borrower, we match her total out-
standing debt from CR and her loan amount at origination from TAXIA. We
compute the principal payment as the difference in the loan outstanding be-
tween two consecutive months. The interest payment is the loan outstanding
times the interest rate, which is the APR minus loan fees. The APR is directly
observable from TAXIA; for loan fees we use the median spread between the
APR and the interest rate available from MutuiOnline. To get original mort-






where R is the fixed instalment, K is the initial capital, i is the interest rate
on the residual capital, and n is the number of payments. Table A.1 shows
that the median, mean and maximum maturity in our dataset is similar to the
one resulting from official statistics for residential mortgages in Italy (Regional
Business Lending Survey, RBLS). Mortgages with maturity greater or equal
than 30 years are 19 per cent in our dataset (according to the RBLS they are
almost 21 per cent).
Table A.1: Maturity
Median Mean Maximum
CR - our computation 21 22 42
RBLS 22 22 42
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Loan-to-Value Inference
To infer the mortgage loan-to-value, we rely on data from the online platform
(MutuiOnline). Importantly, this represents the only source of information on
the LTV currently available in Italy.
According to MutuiOnline, dispersion in mortgage pricing is mostly driven
by contract characteristics, and in particular by the lender, the rate type (ad-
justable versus fixed), the mortgage maturity and the LTV, which all together
act as summary statistics for all other relevant characteristics, including bor-
rower income, location and job-type.
Our estimation methodology relies on the idea that for each combination
of lender, rate type, maturity, province, observable for newly originated mort-
gage contracts from CR and TAXIA, there is only one corresponding LTV
with the same combination in the online offer dataset. Figure A.1 shows the
Adjusted R-squared of regressions of the offered APR on a set of dummy vari-
ables obtained using data from the digital platform only. This set of regressions
allows us to get a decomposition of the explanatory power of borrower and con-
tract characteristics. The Adjusted−R2 reaches 90 per cent when we include
dummies for contract characteristics and bank FE. Adding dummies for the
location of the house and borrower-level controls does not explain the residual
variation in the offered APR. Model 6 includes the interaction of the lender,
the rate type, the maturity, the LTV and the province; the R-squared is close
to one, meaning that any characteristic other than those included in the above
regression should bring almost no additional variation in the offered APR.
For new mortgage contracts the LTV is not obervable, but for any observ-
able combination of lender, mortgage rate, maturity, province, and equilibrium
APR, Figure A.1 implies that we can uniquely identify the LTV from the corre-
sponding combination in the offer dataset. Table A.2 illustrates this procedure
with a very stylized example.
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Model 6: Contract x Lender x Province
Model 5: + Borrower Characteristics
Model 4: + Province FE
Model 3: + Bank FE
Model 2: Contract characteristics
Model 1: Only LTV
Note: The chart shows the Adjusted − R2 of regressions of the offered APR on a set of
dummy variables. Model 1 includes only dummies for the LTV. Model 2 adds dummies for
the mortgage rate and maturity. Model 3 adds fixed effects for the lender. Model 4 adds
province fixed effects. Model 5 adds dummies for borrower characteristics (age, income level
and job type). For tractability of our dataset, we hereby disregard the time dimension and
run all regressions at one single date. The chart presents results for the latest available date
(December 2018). The Adjusted−R2 for regressions at previous dates are almost identical.
Source: MutuiOnline.
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Table A.2: LTV inference: illustrative example
Lender LTV Rate type Maturity Province Month APR (%)
CR A 60
∗ Fixed-rate 20 Rome March 1
B 80∗ Fixed-rate 20 Rome March 2
MutuiOnline
A 60 Fixed-rate 20 Rome March 1
A 80 Fixed-rate 20 Rome March 2
B 60 Fixed-rate 20 Rome March 1
B 80 Fixed-rate 20 Rome March 2
* Values inferred from MutuiOnline data
Note: The mortgage LTV is not directly observable for originated mortgage contracts. The
table illustrates the methodology used to infer it from online platform data. The idea is the
following: for each combination of observable characteristics of the mortgage contract (rate
type, maturity, province, time) and equilibrium APR available from the Credit Register,
there is only one corresponding combination with the same characteristics and the same
offered APR in the MutuiOnline dataset, to which is associated a unique value of the LTV.
We use this value as a proxy for the LTV at origination.
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Robustness
Table A.3: Household’s transition towards the rebranding lender
Switchers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Rebranding Rebranding Rebranding Rebranding
Previous High 0.186*** 0.0368** 0.194*** 0.0351**
(0.0551) (0.0146) (0.0553) (0.0158)
Previous Medium 0.000647 0.00511 -0.00706 0.00552
(0.0461) (0.0198) (0.0445) (0.0194)
Treated -0.0613 0.0764 -0.0474 0.0807
(0.228) (0.141) (0.241) (0.144)
POST 0.183*** 0.0418*** 0.177*** 0.0456***
(0.0423) (0.0131) (0.0420) (0.0146)
POST × Treated 0.166 -0.0920 0.144 -0.0870
(0.261) (0.140) (0.286) (0.143)
Previous High × POST -0.242*** -0.0256 -0.238*** -0.0223
(0.0539) (0.0188) (0.0548) (0.0189)
Previous High × Treated -0.610*** -0.161 -0.622** -0.165
(0.227) (0.149) (0.245) (0.152)
Previous High × POST × Treated 0.453 0.202 0.462 0.196
(0.299) (0.157) (0.302) (0.158)
Previous Medium × POST -0.499*** 0.0313 -0.497*** 0.0318
(0.0626) (0.0235) (0.0608) (0.0226)
Previous Medium × Treated -0.409* -0.126 -0.422* -0.123
(0.228) (0.166) (0.242) (0.160)
Previous Medium × POST × Treated 0.169 0.144 0.176 0.138
(0.251) (0.160) (0.289) (0.151)
Branches 0.193 0.225
(0.127) (0.138)
Bin FE Y Y N N
Bank chacacteristics N Y N Y
Borrower chacacteristics N Y N Y
Observations 1,554 1,554 1,554 1,554
R-squared 0.176 0.927 0.135 0.922
Standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for mortgage contracts originated
with the group implementing a rebranding strategy. Switchers are indebted borrowers that
go to the rebranding lender for the first time since 2000. Previous High, Medium and Low are
dummies defined according to the 2018 distribution of newly originated mortgage contracts,
and reflect the previous lender’s ranking in terms of APR within bin. Bins are combinations
of mortgage LTV, maturity and rate type. POST is a time dummy equal to one starting
from the third quarter of 2018 and zero before. Treated is a dummy variable equal to one for
provinces directly affected by the rebranding and zero for remaining unaffected provinces.
Branches is the lender’s share of physical branches by province. Bank characteristics include
size, capital ratio, liquidity ratio and NPL ratio. Borrower characteristics include age,
gender, nationality, and a dummy for past default. First-time borrowers and old clients
are excluded. Category excluded is the previous lender with Low price ranking. Data are
quarterly.
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Transition Probability
Table B.1: Transition Matrix: Treated Provinces, Pre-Rebranding
TO:
Low Medium Top Total
Low 17.5 11.7 3.25 32.4
FROM: Medium 6.50 36.7 2.0 45.1
Top 4.63 4.90 12.9 22.4
Total 28.6 53.2 18.1 100.0
Table B.2: Transition Matrix: Treated Provinces, Post-Rebranding
TO:
Low Medium Top Total
Low 21.7 9.2 1.5 32.4
FROM: Medium 11.3 32.1 1.7 45.1
Top 7.5 6.6 8.3 22.4
Total 40.5 47.9 11.6 100.0
Note: Tables B.1 and B.2 report the transition matrices of borrowers in treated provinces
across lenders with different rankings before and after the rebrading event, respectively.
We compare transition probabilities before and after the rebranding within the same set
of provinces to exclude the possibility of differences due to geographical characteristics and
ensure homogeneity. 32.4% of the households start with a low-price lender, 45% of them
with a medium-price, and the remaining 22% with a high-price one. Before the rebranding
about 50% of them do not move; while almost 17% switch to a low-price lender. Following
the rebranding, the share of households that do not move shrinks to 40%, and the share of
those moving to a cheaper lender exceeds 25%. Source: CR-MO dataset.
102
C. Appendix to Chapter 3
MutuiOnline Evidence
Figure C.1: MutuiOnline: example of a mortgage application
Figure C.2: MutuiOnline: example of a mortgage application pre-approval
Source: MutuiOnline website.
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Figure C.3: Dataset construction
(a) Month t
(b) Month t+1
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Figure C.4: Mortgage application versus mortgage origination
(a) Mortgage application by loan amount (b) Mortgage origination by loan amount
(c) Mortgage application by LTV ratio (d) Mortgage origination by loan amount
Note: Data refer to the period 2016-2020. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Table C.1: Distribution of mortgage rate by borrower and contract characteristics
LTV Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
50 per cent 1.27 1.13 0.58 0.80 1.70
60 per cent 1.37 1.25 0.56 0.90 1.75
80 per cent 1.48 1.40 0.58 0.99 1.85
85 per cent 3.01 2.55 0.87 2.13 3.90
Maturity Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
10 years 1.23 1.12 0.59 0.85 1.45
15 years 1.36 1.29 0.63 0.88 1.70
20 years 1.43 1.35 0.65 0.90 1.84
30 years 1.68 1.68 0.71 1.05 2.20
Rate type Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
Fixed 1.87 1.77 0.59 1.50 2.10
Adjustable 1.03 0.94 0.45 0.78 1.13
Income Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
2000 euro 1.44 1.30 0.68 0.93 1.85
4000 euro 1.41 1.28 0.66 0.90 1.80
Employment status Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
Permanent contract 1.42 1.30 0.65 0.90 1.84
Other 1.45 1.27 0.74 0.90 1.84
Age Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
30 years 1.43 1.30 0.67 0.90 1.84
40 years 1.43 1.29 0.67 0.90 1.84
Mortgage type Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
First-time home buyer 1.38 1.20 0.67 0.88 1.80
Subrogation 1.47 1.35 0.67 0.97 1.87
Geographical area Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
North-East 1.42 1.30 0.66 0.91 1.81
North-West 1.43 1.29 0.70 0.88 1.85
Centre 1.43 1.30 0.66 0.90 1.83
South 1.42 1.29 0.66 0.92 1.83
Islands 1.44 1.30 0.69 0.90 1.85
Note: Data are in percentage points and refer to the average values between March 2018
and August 2019. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Table C.2: Distribution of no-offer rate by borrower and contract characteristics
LTV Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
50 per cent 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
60 per cent 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
80 per cent 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
85 per cent 0.94 1.00 0.24 1.00 1.00
Maturity Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
10 years 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
15 years 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
20 years 0.57 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
30 years 0.59 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Interest rate Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
Fixed 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Adjustable 0.57 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Income Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
2000 euro 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
4000 euro 0.57 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Employement Status Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
Permanent contract 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
Other 0.83 1.00 0.38 1.00 1.00
Age Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
30 years 0.59 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
40 years 0.59 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Mortgage type Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
First-time home buyer 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Subrogation 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Geographical area Mean Median Std.Dev p25 p75
North-East 0.59 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
North-West 0.59 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Centre 0.59 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
South 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Islands 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Note: The no-offer rate is defined as 1 minus the share of banks that offer a product for
each given profile. Data are in percentage points and refer to the average values between
March 2018 and August 2019. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Table C.3: Fixed-rate mortgages
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 Min Max Std.Dev
5 largest banking groups
Interest rates 1.98 1.25 1.5 1.8 2.2 3.65 0.5 4.05 0.77
APR 2.17 1.44 1.69 1.98 2.36 3.83 0.69 4.43 0.79
Other significant institutions
Interest rates 1.87 1.25 1.55 1.85 2.2 2.58 0.4 3.73 0.5
APR 2.05 1.45 1.74 2.05 2.34 2.69 0.78 3.29 0.47
Less significant institutions
Interest rates 1.89 1.3 1.51 1.8 2.2 2.56 0.85 4.4 0.54
APR 2.1 1.5 1.71 2.02 2.37 2.88 1.03 4.72 0.55
Subsidiaries
Interest rates 1.81 1.2 1.5 1.71 2.15 2.44 0.61 3.08 0.48
APR 1.94 1.35 1.61 1.85 2.29 2.57 0.82 3.13 0.45
Online banks
Interest rates 1.75 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.99 2.2 0.6 3.84 0.4
APR 1.82 1.37 1.57 1.76 2.03 2.28 0.6 3.95 0.39
Note: Data are in percentage points and refer to the average values between March 2018
and August 2019. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Table C.4: Adjustable-rate mortgages
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 Min Max Std.Dev
5 largest banking groups
Interest rates 0.99 0.58 0.73 0.88 1.08 2.03 0.33 2.28 0.45
APR 1.15 0.74 0.9 1.02 1.23 2.12 0.43 2.52 0.47
Other significant institutions
Interest rates 1.02 0.58 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 0.24 1.95 0.31
APR 1.18 0.78 1.0 1.2 1.34 1.55 0.51 2.03 0.28
Less significant institutions
Interest rates 1.07 0.65 0.7 0.9 1.15 1.83 0.42 3.43 0.52
APR 1.25 0.77 0.88 1.1 1.36 2.05 0.52 3.8 0.55
Subsidiaries
Interest rates 1.38 0.66 0.86 1.07 1.46 2.9 0.4 2.9 0.77
APR 1.51 0.8 0.97 1.23 1.47 2.98 0.55 3.27 0.79
Online banks
Interest rates 0.94 0.68 0.79 0.95 1.04 1.25 0.53 1.59 0.22
APR 0.99 0.77 0.88 0.99 1.07 1.24 0.57 1.61 0.2
Note: Data are in percentage points and refer to the average values between March 2018
and August 2019. Source: MutuiOnline.
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Figure C.5: Offer rate by bank category
(a) Fixed rate (b) Adjustable rate
Note: Data are in percentage points. Source: MutuiOnline.
